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Abstract 
Should the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms apply to constrain the actions of  
Aboriginal governments in Canada exercising the “inherent right” of  self-government? Is 
the Charter’s application to these governments necessary to secure the human rights of  
those they govern, or would it amount to a violation of  aboriginal sovereignty that, in any 
case, would do undue violence to the cultural practices and traditions of  Aboriginal 
communities? This article seeks to contribute to the larger debate over how to balance the 
rights of  individuals with the rights of  groups by laying out a methodical, clear-eyed analysis 
of  the strengths and weaknesses of  the major arguments found in the literature for and 
against the Charter’s application. I argue that while the Charter’s application to inherent-right 
governments would amount to a limit on Aboriginal sovereignty, this is justifiable, in light of  
the fact that Aboriginal sovereignty should not be construed as absolute, and given the 
Supreme Court of  Canada’s assertion that the purpose of  the Canadian Constitution’s 
recognition of  Aboriginal rights is reconciliation. I claim that requiring that the right of  
Aboriginal self-government be exercised in accordance with the Charter would further the 
goal of  reconciliation, whereas allowing the right to be exercised irrespective of  the 
requirements of  the Charter would impede it. I thus conclude that the Charter should apply 
to inherent-right governments, although I stress that it should be applied in a flexible 
manner, in recognition of  the fact that the proper safeguarding of  rights can occur in 
different ways in different cultural contexts. 
French translation  
Réconcilier les souverainetés, réconcilier les peuples: La Charte Canadienne des droits et des 
libertés devrait-elle s’appliquer aux gouvernements autochtones de droit inhérent ? 
La Charte Canadienne des droits et des libertés devrait-elle pouvoir limiter les actions des 
gouvernements autochtones qui exercent leur ‘droit inhérent’ à l’autonomie 
gouvernementale au Canada ? L’application de la Charte à ces gouvernements est-elle 
nécessaire à la préservation des droits humains de ceux qu’ils gouvernent ou, au contraire, 
cela constituerait-il une violation de la souveraineté autochtone qui ferait indûment violence 
aux pratiques et traditions des communautés autochtones ? Cet article cherche à contribuer 
au plus large débat sur la manière de balancer les droits de l’individu avec les ceux des 
groupes en proposant une analyse méthodique et lucide des forces et des faiblesses des 
arguments principaux rencontrés dans la littérature à la fois pour et contre l’application de la 
Charte. J’argumenterai que, bien que l’application de la Charte aux gouvernements 
autochtones de droit inhérent poserait une limite à la souveraineté autochtone, cette 
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limitation est justifiable, puisque d’une part la souveraineté autochtone ne devrait pas être 
entendue comme absolue, et que, de l’autre, la Cour Suprême du Canada a affirmé que le but 
de la reconnaissance des droits des autochtones dans la Constitution canadienne est la 
réconciliation. J’affirme que requérir que le droit à l’autonomie gouvernementale autochtone 
soit exercé conformément à la Charte participerait à la promotion la réconciliation, alors 
qu’au contraire permettre un exercice du droit indépendant des exigences de la Charte 
l’entraverait. Je conclurai donc que la Charte devrait s’appliquer aux gouvernements de droit 
inhérent, toutefois je souligne abondamment le besoin que celle-ci soit appliquée de manière 
flexible, en reconnaissance du fait que la préservation appropriée des droits peut prendre 
diverses formes au sein de divers contextes culturels.  
Spanish translation  
¿Debería aplicarse la Carta de Derechos y Libertades de Canadá para restringir la capacidad 
de los gobiernos indígenas de ejercer el "derecho inherente" al autogobierno? ¿Es necesaria 
la aplicación de la Carta a estos gobiernos para garantizar los derechos humanos de quienes 
gobiernan, o equivaldría a una violación de la soberanía indígena que, en cualquier caso, 
violentaría indebidamente las prácticas y tradiciones culturales de las comunidades indígenas?  
El presente artículo busca contribuir al debate más amplio sobre cómo equilibrar los 
derechos individuales con los derechos de los grupos, mediante un análisis metódico y claro 
de las fortalezas y debilidades de los principales argumentos encontrados en la literatura a 
favor y en contra de la aplicación de la Carta.  
Sostengo que, si bien la aplicación de la Carta a los gobiernos de derechos inherentes 
supondría un límite a la soberanía indígena, el límite es justificable, dado que la soberanía 
indígena no debe interpretarse como absoluta y debido a la afirmación del Tribunal Supremo 
del Canadá que la reconciliación es el propósito del reconocimiento de los derechos 
indígenas en la Constitución canadiense.  
Afirmo que exigir que el ejercicio del derecho al autogobierno indígena se ejerza de 
conformidad con la Carta promovería el objetivo de la reconciliación, mientras permitir el 
ejercicio del derecho independientemente de los requisitos de la Carta lo impediría. Por lo 
tanto, concluyo que la Carta debe aplicarse a los gobiernos de derechos inherentes, aunque 
recalco que debe aplicarse de manera flexible, reconociendo que la salvaguarda adecuada de 
los derechos puede ocurrir de maneras distintas en diferentes contextos culturales. 
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Introduction 
 In the notorious 1992 case of  Norris v Thomas, Hood J. of  the British Columbia 
Supreme Court found that the plaintiff, David Thomas, a member of  the Lyackson Band 
(part of  the Coast Salish People), had been “grabbed” and taken against his will by other 
members of  the band to a ceremonial longhouse.  He was imprisoned there for four days 1
without food and forced to undergo a spirit dancer initiation ceremony that included being 
made to walk naked in a creek and being bitten and whipped by his captors. According to his 
testimony, at no time did he consent to the treatment he received. The Court found—over 
the protestations of  the defence that the defendant band members’ conduct amounted to 
the exercise of  an Aboriginal right protected by s. 35(1) of  Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982—
that there was insufficient evidence to show that such a right existed.  Moreover, Hood J. 2
reasoned, if  there did exist an Aboriginal right to conduct spirit dancing initiation 
ceremonies, “those aspects of  it which were contrary to English common law, such as the 
use of  force, assault, battery, and wrongful imprisonment, did not survive the introduction 
of  English law in British Columbia.”  His Honour further wrote that “[w]hile the plaintiff  3
may have special rights and status in Canada as an Indian, the ‘original’ rights and freedoms 
he enjoys can be no less than those enjoyed by fellow citizens, Indian and non-Indian alike.”  4
This case represents a particularly stark example of  the way in which the collective 
rights of  an Aboriginal group might come into conflict with the individual rights of  specific 
members of  that group.  How, if  at all, should the law of  Canada be brought to bear in such 5
scenarios? Should the rights of  the individual trump those of  the collective? Should it be the 
other way round? This paper will wade into this larger debate by laying out a methodical, 
clear-eyed analysis of  the strengths and weaknesses of  the major arguments found in the 
literature for and against applying the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms to Aboriginal 
“inherent-right” governments in Canada. Is the Charter’s application to such governmental 
action—i.e., action taken pursuant to the inherent right of  Aboriginal self-government 
believed by many to be contained within s. 35 of  the Constitution Act, 1982 —necessary in 6
order to protect the basic human rights of  individual Aboriginal Canadians living under 
those governments? Or would the Charter’s application do violence to the cultures and 
* Dr. Matt Watson is a Lecturer in the TC Beirne School of  Law at the University of  Queensland. 
 Norris v Thomas [1992] 2 CNLR 139 at para 9, 1992 CarswellBC 740 (BCSC).1
 Ibid at para 103.2
 Ibid.3
 Ibid at para 110.4
 For a specific discussion on this case as drawing out a tension between individual and collective rights, see generally Thomas Isaac, 5
“Individual versus collective rights: Aboriginal people and the significance of  Thomas v Norris” (1992) 21:3 Man LJ 618; Canada, Canadian 
Human Rights Commission, Balancing Collective and Individual Rights: Implementation of  Section 1.2 of  the Canadian Human Rights Act (Ottawa: 
Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2010). For an extended argument that viewing this case and others like it solely within the individual 
rights versus collective rights paradigm obscures how courts are actually deciding these cases, see also Avigail Eisenberg, “The politics of  
individual and group difference in Canadian jurisprudence” (1994) 27:1 CJPS. 
 Section 35(1) reads: “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of  the aboriginal peoples of  Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” For 6
the view that s. 35 encompasses an inherent right to self-government, see Report of  the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the 
Relationship, vol 2 (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996) at 166-167 [Royal Commission: Restructuring the Relationship]; Canada, 
Department of  Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Aboriginal Self-Government: The government of  Canada’s approach to implementation of  the 
inherent right and the negotiation of  Aboriginal Self  Government (Ottawa: Minister of  Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1995) at 3–4; 
Kerry Wilkins, “…But we need the eggs: the Royal Commission, the Charter of  Rights and the inherent right of  Aboriginal self-
government” (1999) 49:1 UTLJ 53.
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traditions of  these communities, thus failing to respect Aboriginal sovereignty and the 
inherent right of  self-government? After canvassing the key arguments on both sides, I 
conclude that it is appropriate for the Charter to be applied, in a culturally sensitive manner, 
to inherent-right governments, since this would best advance the goal of  reconciliation that 
animates the Constitution’s recognition of  Aboriginal rights in s. 35. 
I.      Preliminaries 
 Whether the Charter should apply to inherent-right Aboriginal governments—that is, 
whether it is appropriate that it apply—might be thought of  as the wrong question to ask. 
Perhaps instead we should simply focus on whether it does apply as a matter of  law. On that 
score, the current state of  the law would appear to be that Aboriginal governments 
exercising inherent (as opposed to delegated) powers of  self-government do not fall within 
the scope of  section 32 of  the Charter—which states that the Charter applies to “the 
Parliament and government of  Canada” and to “the legislature and government of  each 
province”—and thus are not automatically subject to the Charter’s provisions.  There is, 7
however, considerable uncertainty on the point, and it is one that has generated significant 
scholarly disagreement.  Further, as constitutional law scholar Patrick Macklem has argued, it 8
is likely that the courts would apply the Charter to exercises of  the inherent right of  self-
government where this right is exercised in the context of  a formal self-government 
agreement that specifically states that the Charter is to apply —i.e., where the Charter’s 9
application is consented to by the relevant Aboriginal government and the federal and 
provincial governments.   10
 See, e.g. Wilkins, ibid; Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal governments and the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms” (1996) 34:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 7
61; Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, University of  Saskatchewan, 
2001) 215; Peter Hogg and Mary Ellen Turpel, “Implementing Aboriginal self-government: constitutional and jurisdictional issues,” (1995) 
74:2 Can Bar Rev at 192 & 214, citing RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 SCR 573 (as authority for the proposition that s. 32 represents an 
exhaustive statement of  the bodies that are bound by the Charter).
 See Hogg and Turpel, ibid (claiming, notwithstanding their view that s. 32 is an exhaustive list of  the entities subject to the Charter, that the “it 8
is probable that a court would hold that Aboriginal governments are bound by the Charter” at 214); Royal Commission: Restructuring the 
Relationship, supra note 6 (“[t]he Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms applies to Aboriginal governments and regulates relations with 
individuals within their jurisdiction” at 160). For a book-length argument for why the Charter should apply to Aboriginal governments, see also 
David Leo Milward, Aboriginal Justice and the Charter: Realizing a Culturally Sensitive Interpretation of  Legal Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012). 
Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of  Canada (Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 2001) at 202, 225, 226, 199, and 201 
has written that whether the Charter applies to exercises of  the inherent-right of  self-government depends on whether one adopts an 
‘inclusive; or ‘exclusive’ interpretation of  s. 32. (Favoring an inclusive interpretation, he argues that the Charter should be read as applying 
where inherent-right governments implement “internal restrictions” that “clash with Charter guarantees,”, but permitting these governments to 
introduce “external protections” that “protect interests associated with indigenous difference” at 225-226. If  the question that is asked is the 
perfectly general one of  whether the Charter applies to Aboriginal governments, the answer is surely yes. That is, whether the Charter applies to 
a given Aboriginal government depends on what sort of  governmental authority the Aboriginal government is exercising—i.e., on “whether it 
is delegated, treaty-based, or inherent in nature” at 199. It is uncontroversial, for instance, that Aboriginal governments exercising delegated 
statutory authority are subject to the Charter. When it comes to “treaty-based Aboriginal governmental authority, the Charter applies at least to 
federal and provincial participation in the treaty process, and by extension to the treaty itself ” at 201). See also Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law 
of  Canada, 5th Ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2018) at §37-13.  
 It is in fact the stated policy of  the federal government that “the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms should bind all governments in 9
Canada, so that Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal Canadians alike may continue to enjoy equally the rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the Charter. Self-government agreements, including treaties, will, therefore, have to provide that the Canadian Charter of  Rights and 
Freedoms applies to Aboriginal governments and institutions in relation to all matters within their respective jurisdictions and 
authorities” (Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, “The Government of  Canada’s Approach to Implementation of  the 
Inherent Right and the Negotiation of  Aboriginal Self-Government” (n.d.), online: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, <www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/ 1100100031844#inhrsg>).  
 See Macklem, supra note 8 (“[E]ven if  the Charter does not independently apply to the exercise of  inherent Aboriginal governmental 10
authority, it likely applies on consent of  the parties” at 201). 
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 This point brings us, however, to another potential practical obstacle that might lie 
in the way of  applying the Charter to inherent-right governments—s. 25 of  the Charter. 
Section 25 states that:  
The guarantee in this Charter of  certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as 
to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that 
pertain to the aboriginal peoples of  Canada including 
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal Proclamation 
of  October 7, 1763; and 
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of  land claims agreements or 
may be so acquired.  11
If  section 25 is given a literal interpretation,  then even if  the Charter would technically 12
apply to an inherent-right government where that government has consented to the Charter’s 
application—i.e., even if  s. 32 would not preclude its application in these circumstances—s. 
25 would nevertheless appear to prevent the Charter’s other provisions from having any real 
effect on the government’s actions. For example, since Aboriginal self-government is now 
increasingly understood (albeit without the benefit of  a dispositive judicial pronouncement 
on the question) to be encompassed by s. 35(1) —and thus by s. 25—the latter provision 13
would appear to preclude the possibility that the Charter could be used to strike down or 
otherwise constrain exercises of  the inherent right, since that would amount to ‘derogating’ 
from an Aboriginal right contemplated by s. 25.  I do not, however, regard the provision as 14
an insuperable obstacle on this score. A full analysis of  how s. 25 ought to be interpreted—
and how such an interpretation would affect the Charter’s application to inherent-right 
governments in particular—must await another day. However, analyses of  the legislative 
history of  s. 25 not only reveal that there was no consensus that a right to self-government 
was included in the “Aboriginal rights” referred to by s. 25 (or by 35(1)), but also 
demonstrate that s. 25 was included for the specific purpose of  ensuring that the Charter’s s. 
15 equality guarantees could not be used to strike down legal rights granted to Aboriginal 
peoples qua Aboriginal peoples (on the grounds that such special rights amounted to 
 Constitution Act, 1982, s 25, Part I of  the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Canadian 11
Charter].
 There is a dearth of  judicial treatment of  s. 25, with the result that the proper interpretation of  the section is still very much an open 12
question. Cf  R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 [2008] 2 SCR 483 (the majority decision, in obiter, adopted the view that s. 25 is not an “absolute bar” to 
Charter review, but rather an “interpretive provision informing the construction of  potentially conflicting Charter rights” at para 64; Bastarache 
J. favored an interpretation of  s. 25 according to which the provision is a “shield” for the rights it encompasses, rendering them immune from 
Charter review, but also asserted that this shield is “obviously” not an absolute one, at paras 93 and 97).
 See Ian Peach, “More than a Section 35 Right: Indigenous Self-government as Inherent in Canada’s Constitutional Structure” (2011) at 2–3, 13
online (pdf): Canadian Political Science Association <www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2011/Peach.pdf> (the Supreme Court “has [hinted] at an 
openness to finding a right of  self-government within section 35 of  the Constitution Act, 1982, but it has yet to clearly pronounce on the 
question and, instead, continually encourages governments to negotiate a resolution to the self-government claims of  Indigenous peoples”. 
For such a ‘hint’, see generally R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821 [Pamajewon]. Peach also notes “[l]ikely the strongest case law on the existence 
of  an aboriginal right to self-government is the decision of  the British Columbia Supreme Court in Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney 
General), 2001 BCSC 1123, though this case was never appealed to a higher court”). See also the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples’ 
Final Report, supra note 9, at 95, which called for “explicit recognition that section 35 includes the inherent right of  self-government as an 
Aboriginal right.” This is in fact the official policy position of  the Canadian federal government: “[T]he Government of  Canada recognizes 
the inherent right of  self-government as an existing Aboriginal right under section 35 of  the Constitution Act, 1982” Crown-Indigenous 
Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, supra note 9.
 For what I believe to be an ultimately misguided attempt to blunt the apparent force of  s. 25 by way of  positing a tenuous distinction 14
between having a right to self-government and exercising such a right, see also Brian Slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution: A Question 
of  Trust”, (1992) 71 Can Bar Rev 261 at 286–287.
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discrimination against non-Aboriginals).  To instead read s. 25 as a total shield protecting 15
the exercise of  Aboriginal self-government from Charter scrutiny would thus appear to 
ignore legislative intent, and to turn away from a purposive interpretation of  the provision. 
This “complete shield”  interpretation would also sit very uncomfortably with current s. 35 16
jurisprudence, as it would imply that whereas policy concerns may rightly limit s. 35 
Aboriginal rights (per the Sparrow test ), the Charter’s provisions could never do so. Further, 17
as David Milward has pointed out, “the odd time that any Supreme Court of  Canada justice 
has ever commented on this issue [of  the effect of  s. 25] it has been in favour of  the 
Charter’s having some application to Aboriginal governments.”  Milward draws the 18
conclusion that “[i]f  the Court is ever called upon to directly decide this issue, irrespective of  
any present or future composition, the justices may be deeply concerned about exempting 
Aboriginal governments from the Charter.”  19
 Ultimately, however, even if  the Charter’s application to inherent-right governments 
were straightforwardly precluded as a matter of  law, exploring the issue of  whether it would 
be a good thing for the Charter to apply to constrain the actions of  these governments would 
still be worthwhile, since what the law is and what the law should be can plainly be two 
separate things.  Further, the question of  whether it is normatively appropriate for the 20
Charter to apply to inherent-right governments need not be held in abeyance until such time 
as we have definitive word from the courts that ss. 32 and 25 permit the Charter to be applied 
in this manner. For the very question of  how these provisions should be read, it can be 
 See Hogg and Turpel, supra note 7 (“[T]he main purpose of  section 25 is to make clear that the prohibition of  racial discrimination in 15
section 15 of  the Charter is not to be interpreted as abrogating aboriginal or treaty rights that are possessed by a class of  people defined by 
culture or race. It is, therefore, designed as a shield to guard against diminishing aboriginal and treaty rights in situations where non Aboriginal 
peoples might challenge the special status and rights of  Aboriginal peoples as contrary to equality guarantees” at 214). See also Milward, supra 
note 8; Bruce Wildsmith, Aboriginal Peoples and Section 25 of  the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms (Saskatoon: University of  Saskatchewan 
Native Law Centre, 1988) at 2–4. 
 See Celeste Hutchinson, “Case Comment on R v Kapp: An Analytical Framework for Section 25 of  the Charter”, (2007) 52:1 McGill LJ at 16
182. See also Wildsmith, ibid at 182.
 R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at paras 67ff  (QL) [Sparrow].17
 Milward, supra note 8 at 66.18
 Ibid.19
  See e.g Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Governments and the Charter: Lessons from the United States,” (2002) 17:2 CJLS 73 (the article “leaves 20
aside the unresolved question of  whether the Charter currently applies to [inherent-right Aboriginal] governments as a matter of  Canadian 
constitutional law, seeking instead to shed some light on the normative issue of  whether the Charter should apply” at 74). For other works 
touching on this normative question (some of  which also tackle the doctrinal question of  whether the Charter does apply to Aboriginal 
governments), see Milward, supra note 8; Menno Boldt & J Anthony Long, “Tribal Philosophies and the Canadian Charter of  Rights and 
Freedoms” in Menno Boldt & J Anthony Long, eds, The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto: University of  Toronto 
Press, 1985) 165; John Borrows, “Contemporary Traditional Equality: The Effect of  the Charter on First Nation Politics” (1994) 43 UNBLJ 
19; Thomas Isaac and Mary Sue Maloughney, “Dually Disadvantaged and Historically Forgotten?: Aboriginal Women and the Inherent Right 
of  Self-Government” (1992) 21 Man L Rev 453;; J Anthony Long and Katherine Beaty Chiste, “Indian Governments and the Canadian Charter 
of  Rights and Freedoms” (1994) 18:2 Am Indian Culture & Rsch J 91 [Long and Chiste]; Timothy Dickson “Section 25 and Intercultural 
Judgment” (2003) UT Fac L Rev 141; Sharon Donna McIvor, Self-Government and Aboriginal Women in Margaret Jackson & N. Kathleen Sam Banks, 
eds, Ten Years Later: The Charter and Equality for Women: A Symposium Assessing the Impact of  the Equality Provisions on Women in Canada (Burnaby: 
Public Policy Programs, Simon Fraser University at Harbour Centre, 1996) 77; Teresa Nahanee, “Dancing with a Gorilla: Aboriginal Women, 
Justice and the Charter” in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Aboriginal Peoples and the Justice System, Report of  the National Round Table on 
Aboriginal Justice Issues (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1993); Bryan Schwartz, “The Application of  the Canadian Charter of  Rights and 
Freedoms to Aboriginal Governments” in Bryan Schwartz, ed, First Principles, Second Thoughts: Aboriginal Peoples, Constitutional Reform and Canadian 
Statecraft (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986); Aki-Kwe/Mary Ellen Turpel, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter 
of  Rights and Freedoms: Contradictions and Challenges” (1989) 10:2,3 Can Wom Stud 149 [Turpel, “Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms”]; 
Mary Ellen Turpel, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural Differences” (1989-90) 6 Can Hum Rts 
YB 3 [Turpel, “Interpretive Monopolies”]; Royal Commission: Restructuring the Relationship, supra note 6 at 226-234; Wilkins, supra note 6; 
Dan Russell, A People’s Dream: Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000); Bill Rafoss, The Application of  the Canadian 
Charter of  Rights and Freedoms to First Nations’ Jurisdiction: An Analysis of  the Debate (Masters of  Arts In the Department of  Political Studies, 
University of  Saskatchewan , 2005) [unpublished].
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argued, requires that we at least turn our mind to the issue of  the likely beneficial or 
deleterious effects of  the competing interpretations.  In addition, even if  we take the very 21
firm line that it should never be open to judges to engage in this kind of  consequentialist 
reasoning when determining the meaning of  a disputed constitutional provision, it is not at 
all clear that the courts will do so as well—and thereby come down against the Charter’s 
application to inherent-right governments—should they be forced to rule directly on the 
issue.  Thus even if  we think that the consequences of  the Charter’s application in these 22
cases should not inform the courts’ interpretations of  ss. 32 and 25, it seems only prudent 
that we get clear on those consequences, given the possibility that the courts may well apply 
the Charter to inherent-right governmental action at some point in the future.    23
 As a final preliminary matter, it is worth making clear that the question of  whether it 
would be appropriate to apply the Charter to inherent-right governments is of  course 
relevant to the question of  whether it is appropriate as a general matter for the Charter to 
apply to Aboriginal governments of  any sort. By focussing on the question of  whether the 
Charter should apply to inherent-right governments, we take the case against applying the 
Charter to Aboriginal governments generally—i.e., whether the Aboriginal government acts 
pursuant to statutory authority (such as the Indian Act ), or pursuant to a self-government 24
agreement, or via the exercise of  the inherent right of  Aboriginal self-government, or via 
some combination thereof)—at its strongest. This is so because in these cases, where what is 
contemplated is the imposition of  restrictions on how the inherent right of  self-government 
can be exercised, our concerns over diminution of  Aboriginal sovereignty will be at their most 
acute. If, even on this relatively inhospitable terrain, we can make the case that the Charter 
ought to apply, it seems highly likely that the same will be true in contexts where the relevant 
Aboriginal government is not acting purely pursuant to the inherent right of  self-
government, but rather is exercising delegated statutory authority or acting in accordance 
with a self-government agreement.  
II.    Arguments for the Charter’s Application 
 For an argument to this effect, see especially Milward, ibid at 68, who claims that the Charter’s application to inherent-right governments, 21
which would see the Charter’s protections afforded to a wider segment of  Canadians than they otherwise would be, is in keeping with a 
purposive interpretation of  the Charter—given, as he argues, that “in Hunter v. Southam, Chief  Justice Dickson stated at 58 that the goal of  the 
purposive approach is to secure for individuals the full benefit of  the Charter’s protection.” See also Patrick Macklem, supra note 9, who 
concludes at 209 that “[i]nterpreting section 32 of  the Charter as applying to the exercise of  Aboriginal governmental authority recognized by 
the Constitution best accommodates [the] competing concerns” of  respect for “collective values of  community and responsibility” and 
“protect[ing] less powerful members of  Aboriginal societies against potential abuses of  Aboriginal governmental authority.” 
 See Milward, ibid at 67. See also Hogg and Turpel, supra note 7 (“[d]espite the silence of  section 32 on Aboriginal governments, it is 22
probable that a court would hold that Aboriginal governments are bound by the Charter” at 214; their subsequent analysis in that article, 
however, would seem to restrict this prediction to scenarios in which “[self-government institutions have been created or empowered by 
statute,” or “[w]here self-government institutions have been created by an Aboriginal people and empowered by a self-government agreement” 
at 214; they equally note that “[i]t is unlikely that a court would regard section 25 as giving Aboriginal governments blanket immunity from the 
Charter, even though the governments were exercising powers of  self-government derived from a treaty or from an Aboriginal right (the 
inherent right)” at 214–215).
 It is probably also worth considering here that it is not out of  the question that the federal and provincial governments might seek to amend 23
s. 32 to explicitly allow for the Charter’s application to all Aboriginal governments. This was of  course attempted via the 1992 Charlottetown 
Accord, which proposed to enshrine the right of  Aboriginal self-government in the Constitution and, in s. 26(c) of  the Accord’s text, to 
amend s. 32 to refer to “all legislative bodies and governments of  the Aboriginal peoples of  Canada in respect of  all matters within the 
authority of  their respective legislative bodies.”
 Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5.24
2019 Inter Gentes Vol. 2 Issue 1 ! 	83
	 	 	
 Those who advocate for the Charter’s application to inherent-right Aboriginal 
governments generally offer two main arguments for why the Charter should apply.  The 25
first argument usually runs something like this: the Charter must apply to Aboriginal 
governments in order to safeguard the basic human rights of  all Aboriginal Canadians, 
especially the most vulnerable members of  Aboriginal communities. The second argument 
put forward focuses not on the freedom of  individual Aboriginals, but on the institution of  
Canadian citizenship.  Specifically, the argument is that “differential access to Charter rights 
would compromise the character of  Canadian citizenship by denying a substantial part of  its 
benefit to aboriginal Canadians.”  Let us consider both arguments in turn. 26
  A.   The Human Rights Argument 
The human rights protection rationale for the Charter’s application to inherent-right 
governments, as summarized above, is rather straightforward. The argument is that the 
Charter’s provisions protect basic human rights, such as the right to freedom of  expression 
and association, and the right to be free from arbitrary detention, along with other, less 
fundamental sorts of  rights such as rights to minority language education.  Further, the 27
argument runs, Aboriginal Canadians living under inherent-right governments are entitled to 
the protection of  their basic human rights, and the Charter’s application to inherent-right 
governments would be an effective means of  providing them with such protection.  28
Therefore the Charter ought to apply. 
 B.   The Equal Citizenship Argument 
This second argument for the Charter’s application to inherent-right governments asserts that 
differential access to the Charter denies Aboriginal Canadians full citizenship. Specifically, the 
claim is that the ideal of  equal citizenship is undermined when Aboriginal Canadians have, 
relative to non-Aboriginals, less opportunity or, worse yet, no ability to invoke the Charter as 
against their own inherent-right governments. Surely if  the Canadian state demands that 
Aboriginal citizens obey its laws, these individuals are entitled to equal protection of  the law 
in return? On this view, Canadian citizenship cannot but be damaged where a discrete and 
 See Wilkins, supra note 6 at 82–83.25
 Ibid at 83 (Wilkins is here describing an argument that is often employed, but does not endorse it).26
 See Leslie Green, “Are Language Rights Fundamental?” (1987) 25:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 639 (Green argues that language rights, too, are 27
“fundamental”). 
 It is perfectly consistent with this view to concede that the Canadian Charter may not be the most effective possible means of  protecting 28
Aboriginal Canadians living under inherent-right governments from having their human rights violated by those governments. It is clearly 
possible, for instance, to argue that a more effective means of  providing such protection is by way of  bills of  rights drafted by the relevant 
Aboriginal community itself, along the lines of  the already existing Labrador Inuit Charter of  Rights and Responsibilities. See Hogg and Turpel, 
supra note 7 (“[T]he solution might be the development of  an Aboriginal Charter (or Charters) of  Rights which could exist alongside the 
Canadian Charter” at 213). See also Isaac, supra note 5, at 629. Even if  Aboriginal-drafted charters are all to the good, however, this would not 
undermine the central thesis of  this paper—that the Canadian Charter should presently be applied to inherent right Aboriginal governments. 
That thesis clearly can coexist with a belief  that we should hope for a future in which inherent right governments are constrained by 
Aboriginal-drafted charters. Further, since, as the quotation from Hogg and Turpel indicates, it seems clear as a matter of  law that the creation 
of  such Aboriginal-drafted charters would not automatically supplant the Canadian Charter (see Hogg and Turpel, supra note 7, at 218: “Any 
such Aboriginal Charter … could be interpreted alongside the Canadian Charter, although it would not replace the Canadian Charter”; see also 
Milward, supra note 8, at 76–77), the question of  whether the Canadian Charter’s application to inherent-right governments would do more 
harm than good would remain a very live one even in a future environment in which these governments were also constrained by Aboriginal-
drafted charters.
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sizeable segment of  the population is completely denied access to the Charter’s protections.  29
According to this logic, there is an irony to Aboriginal groups’ demands to be recognized as 
‘citizens plus.’  Specifically, in recognizing that Aboriginal Canadians qua Aboriginals are 30
entitled to certain special rights in virtue of  Aboriginals’ distinct cultural traditions, as well as 
their prior occupancy of  and control over much of  the territory now comprising the 
Canadian state, there is a risk that securing these collective rights could involve undermining 
the basic individual rights of  Aboriginals persons. For instance, if  collective Aboriginal rights 
such as the inherent right to self-government are held to be non-derogable, even vis-à-vis 
basic Charter rights,  then Aboriginal communities will be ensured of  their collective 31
Aboriginal rights, but at the cost of  leaving the individuals who make up those various 
communities unable to assert against their Aboriginal governments certain fundamental 
individual rights that the Charter contemplates. In this way, legal recognition of  Aboriginals 
as ‘citizens plus’ may require that they are simultaneously made ‘citizens minus.’    
 I think this is a very compelling argument, but not one that takes its strength solely 
from a concern with citizenship. For instance, we should be and are concerned that unequal 
access to the Charter’s protections undermines equal citizenship not just because enjoying the 
protection of  the Charter is widely regarded as a central feature of  what it is to be a 
Canadian,  but because Aboriginal Canadians not having the same access as non-Aboriginal 32
Canadians leaves the former at a comparative disadvantage. This offends our commitment to 
equality, because we view access to the Charter as a good and as such are rightly concerned 
that this good be distributed equally among all Canadians. However, if  the Charter is a good, 
it is so in light of  the fact that it protects fundamental individual rights from abuse at the 
hands of  governmental authorities. As a result, the argument from equal citizenship 
ultimately relies for its force on the first argument we looked at about the value of  the 
Charter as a means of  vindicating basic human rights. Those who frame their arguments for 
the Charter’s application to Aboriginal governments in terms of  the demands of  citizenship 
 Where a government invokes section 33 of  the Charter—the ‘notwithstanding clause’—this will mean that certain provisions of  the Charter 29
will not apply exactly equally to all Canadians. One might seize on this fact to argue that exempting Aboriginal governments from Charter 
scrutiny cannot possibly offend a norm according to which the Charter applies equally to all Canadians, since such a norm does not exist. 
However, even putting aside the fact that invocations of  s. 33 are very much the exception rather than the rule, the bare presence of  the 
notwithstanding clause merely suggests that should the Charter be held to apply to a given Aboriginal government, that government, like the 
federal and provincial governments to which s. 33 explicitly refers, should have recourse to the section in cases where they feel its invocation is 
warranted—not that they (alone among the orders of  Canadian government) should be totally immune from Charter scrutiny. 
 Alan C Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000) at 67–68 (Cairns takes his title from that 30
of  the so-called “Red Paper” of  1970, composed by Aboriginal Canadians in response to the federal government’s notorious White Paper of  
1969).
  Some of  the very limited judicial treatment of  s. 25 might seem to suggest this. See generally Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General), 31
2000 BCSC 1123 at paras 153–158; R v Kapp, 2006 BCCA 277 (decision by Kirkpatrick JA at paras 117–153); Kapp, supra note 12 (decision by 
Bastarache J at paras 67–123). However, in the Supreme Court of  Canada’s decision in Kapp, an eight member majority of  the Court 
conspicuously declined to adopt an interpretation of  s. 25 of  the Charter that would have this effect, preferring not to issue a definitive 
statement on the matter, and instead allowing the issues surrounding s. 25 to be resolved on a case-by-case basis (at paras 63–65). (That the 
Court exhibited such reticence, when they might have disposed of  the case by holding s. 25 to be a ‘complete shield’ against Charter scrutiny, 
has been interpreted by some as strong evidence that it will be unwilling to countenance such an ousting of  Charter review (see e.g. Milward, 
supra note 8, at 67).)
 See e.g. The Right Honorable Berveley McLachlin, “Remarks of  the Rights Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C. Chief  Justice of  32
Canada” (Canadian Rights and Freedoms: 20 years under the Charter delivered at Ottawa on 17 April 2002), online: <https://www.scc-csc.ca/
judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2002-04-17-eng.aspx>. See also MD, “Charter Fights”, The Economist (7 July 2013), online: <https://
www.economist.com/americas-view/2014/07/07/charter-fights> (when the federal government “asked Canadians to suggest the people and 
feats they want celebrated in 2017, the country’s 150th birthday, Medicare, peacekeeping and the charter of  rights and freedoms were the top 
three accomplishments. Pierre Trudeau, the former Liberal prime minister who brought in the Charter, was the most inspiring Canadian”). See 
also “The Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedom” online: Canadian Human Rights Commission <https://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/historical-
perspective/en/timePortals/milestones/113mile.asp> (according to the Canadian Human Rights Commission, “human rights became an 
intrinsic and irrevocable part of  our Canadian identity” “with [the] signing [of  the Charter]).” See further Lysiane Gagnon, “The Charter and 
Quebec” in Philip Bryden, Steven Davis & John Russell, eds, Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place in Canada’s Political, Legal, 
and Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 2000) 45. Cf  Nik Nanos, “Charter values don’t equal Canadian values: strong support 
for same sex and property rights” (1 February 2013), online: Policy Options <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/the-charter-25/
charter-values-dont-equal-canadian-values-strong-support-for-same-sex-and-property-rights/>.
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should therefore be seen as appealing, ultimately, to the idea that all Canadians are entitled to 
have access to an effective mechanism for challenging governmental action that violates their 
basic rights.  
 C.   Taking Stock 
 Having outlined the human rights argument and the equal citizenship argument, we 
should conclude that there is a strong prima facie case in favour of  the Charter’s application 
to inherent right Aboriginal governments. The Charter—while not universally beloved — is 33
widely regarded not only as a central and unifying feature of  Canadian identity, but also as 
having had a very salutary impact on ensuring that exercises of  governmental power respect 
the basic rights of  citizens.  The onus should therefore be on those who argue that this 34
important rights-protecting mechanism should not be available to Aboriginal Canadians who 
wish to challenge the actions of  their inherent right governments. We will turn now to an 
analysis of  three such arguments. 
III.    Arguments against the Charter’s Application 
 A.   The No Consent Argument 
One argument for why the Charter should not apply to inherent-right Aboriginal 
governments is that Canada’s Aboriginal groups did not consent to the Charter in the first 
place. Kerry Wilkins, for instance, asserts that the Constitutional amendments of  1982 that 
included the Charter were “implemented without the consent, and despite the objections, of  
Canada’s aboriginal peoples.”   35
However, even if  it can fairly be said that Canada’s Aboriginal peoples, taken en bloc, 
objected to the Charter at its inception, it is not clear that applying the Charter to the 
governments of  these communities today is therefore illegitimate. Consider, for instance, the 
case of  Quebec. Quebec’s lack of  consent to the Charter in 1982 is notorious. However, 
more than 35 years after ‘patriation’, few would claim that there is anything fundamentally 
unjust about the fact that the Charter applies to the Quebec government just as it does to the 
governments of  the other provinces. An important reason for this, it would seem, is that 
there is a very clear commitment on the part of  Quebeckers and their government to just 
the sort of  individual liberties the Charter protects. For example, support for the Charter 
today is actually higher in Quebec than anywhere else in Canada. According to the Centre 
for Research and Information on Canada, for instance, 88% of  Canadians nationwide say 
the Charter is a ‘good thing for Canada’, and “72% say it adequately protects the rights of  
 In particular, a perennial objection to bills of  rights, such as the Charter, that authorize judicial review of  legislation is that they are 33
fundamentally anti-democratic. See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, The Core of  the Case against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006); James Allan, 
Democracy in Decline: Steps in the Wrong Direction (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2014); FL Morton, “The Charter Revolution and the 
Court Party” (1992) 30:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 627. 
 See e.g. Kate Sutherland, “The New Equality Paradigm: The Impact of  Charter Equality Principles on Private Law Decisions”, in David 34
Schneiderman & Kate Sutherland, eds, Charting the Consequences: The Impact of  Charter Rights on Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: University of  
Toronto Press, 1997) 245; Didi Herman, “The Good, the Bad, and the Smugly: Sexual Orientation and Perspectives on the Charter”, in David 
Schneiderman & Kate Sutherland, eds, Charting the Consequences: The Impact of  Charter Rights on Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: 
University of  Toronto Press, 1997) 200; Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 35:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 75.
 See Wilkins, supra note 6 at 77.35
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Canadians.”  That survey also finds that “[s]upport for the Charter is strong in all regions, 36
running from a high of  91% in Quebec to a low of  86% in western Canada.”  Similarly, a 37
survey conducted by SES Research on the occasion of  the 25th anniversary of  the Charter 
found that support for the proposition that the Charter was moving the country in the right 
direction was highest in Quebec.  Clear evidence of  the shared philosophical commitment 38
to individual liberties that obtains between Quebec and the rest of  Canada is also found in 
the existence of  Quebec’s own provincial Charter, which is largely of  a piece with Canada’s.   39
In summary, the fact that the Quebec government initially objected to the Charter 
does not mean that the Charter’s present application in that province is unjust. We do not see 
the Quebec government’s being constrained by the Charter as unduly undermining Quebec’s 
collective autonomy, and a significant reason why we don’t see things that way is because 
Quebeckers now do consent to the Charter’s application. So while requiring the Quebec 
government to abide by a Charter to which it did not initially consent might appear unjust on 
its face, this concern is mitigated by the fact that Canadians from every province, especially 
Quebec, appear to share a deep commitment to the liberal values the Charter enshrines. 
   So the no initial consent argument does not succeed on its own. However, 
precisely the sort of  general commitment to the Charter’s protections that explains much of  
why the Charter’s application in Quebec today is not regarded as particularly contentious is 
what is alleged to be conspicuously absent in Aboriginal societies. If  that is the case, then 
does this fact not render the Charter’s application to the governments of  these communities 
illegitimate? This question leads us directly to the second argument against the Charter’s 
application that we will consider. 
 B.   The Alien Values Argument 
 A second argument against applying the Charter to inherent-right governments has it 
that because the values and concepts that animate it are so alien to Aboriginal world views, 
striking down action by inherent-right governments for non-conformity with the Charter 
threatens to undermine the traditions and cultural practices of  the relevant Aboriginal 
community. On this view, any benefits that might accrue from the Charter’s application in 
terms of  the ability of  individual Aboriginals to challenge human rights abuses by their 
inherent-right governments are outweighed by the attendant risks of  (externally imposed) 
cultural degradation. 
Before directly examining the claim that the Charter’s values are alien to Canada’s 
Aboriginal peoples, it is worth getting clear on the fact that the Charter did not emerge out of  
a cultural vacuum. Instead, the document was created by non-Aboriginal Canadians who 
inevitably drew on their own particular cultural values in shaping the Charter’s provisions. 
Thus the Charter does not represent a “view from nowhere.”  It is instead a view from 40
Canada, for Canadians.  Joseph Carens illustrates the point well when he writes that 41
“[p]olitical and legal institutions are simultaneously cultural institutions in ways that are 
 Andrew Parkin, “What is the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms” Center for Research and Information Canada at York University, 36
online: <http://www.yorku.ca/lfoster/2012-13/MPPAL%206130/lectures/WhatistheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms.html>
 Ibid.37
 Nanos, supra note 33.38
 Charter of  human rights and freedoms, CQLR c-12. 39
 This phrase is taken from Thomas Nagel’s book by the same name: The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).40
 Whether it is properly regarded as being ‘for’ all Canadians—i.e., Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike—is one of  the central questions this 41
paper seeks to answer.
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sometimes invisible to those who share the culture.”  Consequently, the notion that the 42
Charter could undermine the very (non-Aboriginal) social life of  which it is a product is 
much less likely than the prospect that it might undermine the traditional practices of  
Aboriginal groups.  We do, then, have reason to worry that imposing a rights regime created 43
within one cultural setting on another, distinct, cultural group may undercut the ability of  the 
latter group to continue to live by their traditional practices. So we can’t short-circuit the 
‘alien values’ argument by denying out of  hand the possibility that the alleged foreignness of  
the Charter’s values will do violence to Aboriginal customs and traditions. We must turn, 
instead, to an evaluation of  the argument’s premise that the liberal values enshrined by the 
Charter are indeed fundamentally alien to Aboriginal societies.  
Essentially, there are two claims that are often made by those who emphasize the 
profound or intractable quality of  the “epistemological problems”  thrown up by “gaps”  44 45
between Aboriginal and Western ways of  knowing and of  looking at the world. First, it is 
suggested that traditional Aboriginal societies did not embrace the value of  personal 
autonomy generally, or individual rights more specifically, that animates both the Charter and 
so much of  Western political thought. Secondly, it is argued that Canada’s Aboriginal peoples 
today cannot embrace the Charter itself  (at least not without denying their unique indigenous 
identity), since it remains a foreign artifact of  a very different cultural tradition. 
 In order to assess these claims, we should begin by dispelling a particularly unhelpful 
and widespread myth. The myth has it that whereas the wider Canadian society, and the 
Charter itself, is undergirded by a staunchly individualist worldview that valorises personal 
autonomy and the negative liberty secured by individual rights, Aboriginal societies are 
characterized by a thoroughgoing communitarian commitment to harmony and balance 
between all aspects of  creation, and understand human freedom as involving a system of  
“reciprocal relations and mutual obligations based on the need to preserve the harmonious 
whole.”  On this view, modern notions of  individual human rights, such as those protected 46
by the Charter, would have been completely foreign to traditional Aboriginal societies. This 
much seems to follow, for instance, from the blunt assertion of  Taiaiake Alfred that “the 
cultural ideal of  respectful coexistence as a tolerant and harmony seeking first principle” that 
was embraced by the original peoples of  Canada, is “[d]iametrically opposed to the possessive 
individualism” that typifies Canadian society and its Constitution.   47
 But this is surely overstated. Without ignoring the very real differences in emphasis 
between Aboriginal and Western society when it comes to conceiving of  the relationship 
between individual freedom and the collective good, we must reject the notion that the wider 
Canadian society and Aboriginal communities fit neatly into opposite sides of  a binary that 
separates individualism from collectivism. Even Mary Ellen Turpel, for instance, (in the 
course of  an article devoted to showing how Aboriginal societies manifest such a “different 
 Joseph H Carens, Culture, Citizenship and Community, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 189.42
 I recognize that this discussion runs the risk of  taking ‘non-Aboriginal Canada’ as a homogenous bloc, which it surely isn’t. There are, for 43
example, marginalized non-Aboriginal communities that also may have cause to see the Charter as fitting uncomfortably with their group’s 
broader social life. My point, however, is that since Aboriginal Canadians had little input into the Charter’s creation, the document has 
something like a built-in sensitivity towards the wider (non-Aboriginal, predominately white, male, and perhaps Anglophone) culture of  those 
who were seated at the drafting table, that does not extend in the same manner to Aboriginal cultures. 
 Turpel, “Interpretive Monopolies”, supra note 20 at 24. 44
 Ibid at 13. 45
 Long and Chiste, supra note 20 at 97.46
 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) xiv (emphasis added). See also 47
Turpel, “Interpretive Monopolies”, supra note 20 (“[t]he collective or communal basis of  Aboriginal life does not really, to my knowledge, have 
a parallel to individual rights: the conceptions of  law are simply incommensurable” at 30).
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human (collective) imagination”  from that animating liberal democracies that the Charter’s 48
application to Aboriginal governments would be an injustice) admits that “[t]here is no polity 
that is purely individualistic or purely collectivist.”  Further, as she goes on to suggest, we 49
should not view “‘society’ as an either-or,” in the sense that Aboriginal communities, if  they 
place great emphasis on the social harmony of  the group, must be entirely collectivist in 
orientation.    50
 What is more, it would be a serious mistake to portray autonomy as alien to the pre-
European contact peoples of  Turtle Island. Taiaiake Alfred himself, for instance, contends 
that “the heart and soul of  indigenous nations” consists in “a set of  values that challenge the 
destructive and homogenizing force of  Western liberalism and free market capitalism.”  51
While this might seem to suggest that indigenous nations do not respect individual freedom, 
Alfred emphatically rejects that notion. He insists that these same indigenous values that 
challenge liberalism also simultaneously “honour the autonomy of  individual conscience.”   52
Alfred’s view of  the importance of  individual autonomy in traditional Aboriginal 
societies is shared by other commentators. According to Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, 
for example, when pressed to list the “cultural traits and values shared by most Indian 
tribes,” one must include “the reaching of  decisions by consensus, institutionalized sharing, 
[and] respect for personal autonomy….”  Moreover, they further assert, “[s]elf-direction 53
(autonomy), an aristocratic prerogative in European society, was everyone’s right in Indian 
society.”  Indeed, many traditional Aboriginal tribes can be regarded as radically libertarian 54
in outlook. Long and Chiste write, for example, that “[h]istorically, Plains Indians did not 
accept the idea that anyone could be given the right to govern others, except for limited 
periods of  time and under restricted circumstances.”  As they also write, again in reference 55
to the Plains Indian groups they studied: 
A great deal of  personal autonomy existed and was reflected in the exercise of  
authority as well as in collective decision-making. Individual autonomy, however, was 
not based on an atomistic view of  human nature, but rather on a concept of  human 
dignity stemming from the equality of  status and interdependence of  individuals 
within the cosmic order, as conceived by the Creator.  56
 With all of  this in mind, the emphasis on community harmony and a cohesive social 
life, common among pre-contact Aboriginal nations, can be seen as a necessity of  survival in 
societies where sustenance often had to be painstakingly coaxed out of  harsh physical 
environments. It was far from a flat rejection of  the value of  individual freedom. 
 We can conclude, then, that the ideal of  personal autonomy that animates many of  
the Charter’s guarantees of  rights and freedoms was far from alien to pre-contact Aboriginal 
 Turpel, “Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms”, supra note 20 at 34.48
 Ibid at 16.49
 Ibid.50
 Alfred, supra note 47 at 60.51
 Ibid.52
 Menno Boldt & J Anthony Long, “Tribal Traditions and European-Western Political Ideologies: The Dilemma of  Canada’s Native Indians” 53
in Menno Boldt, J Anthony Long, & Leroy Little Bear, eds, The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto: Toronto 
University Press, 1985) 333 at 334.
 Ibid at 339.54
 Supra note 20, at 99.55
 Ibid at 98.56
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communities in what is now Canada. Admittedly, however, respect for the larger notion of  
individual autonomy is not the same as acceptance of  the specific individual rights that find 
expression in the Charter. Recall, for instance, the passage from Long and Chiste quoted 
above, to the effect that notions of  autonomy in Plains Indian tribes were premised on a 
commitment to a cosmic order characterized by a system of  right relations among all its 
constituent parts, and especially by the equality and interdependence of  persons. This 
quotation suggests that while the concept of  personal autonomy was not alien to traditional 
Aboriginal societies, the Charter’s language of  individual rights might well have been foreign, 
since for Aboriginal communities autonomy was grounded not in the view of  the individual 
as an atomistic free-chooser which is (rightly or wrongly) said to animate liberalism,  but 57
rather in a conception of  human dignity that presupposes the equality and interdependence 
of  individuals.   
Given this latter view of  the importance of  interdependence, the argument runs, 
insisting on one’s individual rights as against other members of  the community could be 
deeply divisive and may threaten the society’s social fabric. According to Turpel, for instance, 
the very concept of  rights is in fact in irresolvable tension with Aboriginal societies’ 
understandings of  social life.  This is so because Anglo-European political thought since 58
Locke has located “the conceptual basis of  rights analysis in notions of  property and 
exclusive ownership” that were foreign to indigeneity.  Specifically, whereas Aboriginal 59
societies’ understandings of  social life included the idea that autonomy was best secured by 
ensuring dignified, harmonious cooperation between the community’s members, the 
European concept of  rights carries with it “a highly individualistic and negative concept of  
social life based on the fear of  attack on one’s ‘private’ sphere.”   60
Another critique along these lines has been levelled by Gordon Christie, who, in the 
course of  attempting to “highlight […] the cultural divide between Western theorists and the 
worlds of  Aboriginal peoples”, asserts that “a liberal vision underlies and animates the law, 
and … while grounded in this vision, the law cannot protect the interests of  Aboriginal 
peoples.”  As David Milward helpfully summarizes Christie’s views, “the imposition of  61
liberal legal structures amounts to oppression in that it fails to respect the collective 
autonomy of  Aboriginal communities, [and] promotes the pursuit of  individual self-interest 
at the expense of  Aboriginal cultural values of  responsibility.”   62
The problem with this picture of  Charter rights as militantly individualistic is that it
—like the notion that Aboriginal societies are entirely collectivist in orientation—is quite 
hyperbolic. There are, for instance, many different theories of  what it is to have a right. 
Some of  these locate the foundation of  rights in ideas of  ‘property and exclusive 
ownership’, but others do not. It is misleading, therefore, to portray a commitment to 
individual rights as necessarily antithetical to collective projects and community wellbeing. In 
the western tradition, for instance, the two leading accounts of  rights are the interest theory 
 My own view is that the so-called ‘communitarian critique’ of  liberalism misses the mark, since it is a mistake to regard liberals as necessarily 57
presupposing such an atomistic view of  the self. (For prominent examples of  works by liberals who clearly appreciate the way in which 
individual autonomy depends upon and is asserted within a supportive social and cultural milieu, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: 
A Liberal Theory of  Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Alan Patten, Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of  
Minority Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Leslie Green, “What is Freedom For?” (2012) Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No 77/2012. 
 Turpel, “Interpretive Monopolies”, supra note 20 at 509.58
 Ibid at 14–15.59
 Ibid at 15.60
 Christie, “Law, Theory and Aboriginal Peoples” (2003) 2 Indigenous LJ at 68.61
 Milward, supra note 9 at 51.62
2019 Inter Gentes Vol. 2 Issue 1 ! 	90
	 	 	
and the will theory. On the will theory, “the function of  a right is to give its holder control 
over another’s duty”,  in the sense that the right-holder is “a small scale sovereign”  with 63 64
the power, for instance, to either grant of  refuse permission for someone else to use their 
property in a certain way. On the interest theory, by contrast, rights protect the right-holders’ 
interests. If  a person has a right to be provided with the necessities of  life, say, that is 
because it is in her interest to receive them. What is important to note is that the interest 
theory is in considerably less tension than the will theory with the idea of  a society’s 
communal life being a dense and delicate web of  interdependence. And while there 
continues to be an energetic, if  perhaps not particularly fruitful,  debate among will 65
theorists and interest theorists, the interest theory appears to be more heavily subscribed to.  
Those who would claim that the very notion of  rights is incompatible with 
indigeneity are thus guilty of  homogenizing the rich theoretical literature on rights, or of  
ignoring that literature altogether. In addition, they will have their work cut out for them 
when it comes to explaining away the widely accepted view that groups, and not just 
individual persons, can be and often are rights-holders. Further, there is widespread, albeit 
not universal, recognition today that individuals possess not only so-called ‘negative’ rights—
such as freedom from various forms of  governmental control or abuse—but ‘positive’ rights 
as well—such as entitlements to various social, cultural, and economic goods and the 
opportunity to participate in the social, cultural, and economic life of  their communities. 
The picture of  rights as inherently divisive weapons that individuals employ, consciously or 
unconsciously, to the detriment of  social harmony is much harder to maintain once we allow 
into view such social, economic, and cultural rights. 
In the end, the argument put forward by Turpel is doubly misleading. She invokes, 
as we saw, a Lockean view of  rights as grounded in notions of  private property in order to 
suggest that the rights the Charter protects are alien to Aboriginal Canadians today. Notice 
that Turpel is holding up for analysis a particular take on the basis of  rights that was in 
vogue hundreds of  years ago, but holds much less sway today. It may well be, for instance, 
that Locke’s views about rights to property would have been completely foreign to every pre-
contact Aboriginal group in North America. But what clearly does not follow is that the 
conception of  rights that the Charter articulates today is foreign to Canada’s Aboriginal 
communities as we find them today.  
As it happens, furthermore, the bare notion of  individual rights as against the larger 
community would not have been inconsistent “with Aboriginal societies’ understandings of  
social life” (to use Turpel’s words again) even in the pre-contact period. Certainly, some of  
the specific conceptions of  the nature of  rights that leading theorists in the liberal tradition 
have from time to time advanced would likely have been in “irresolvable tension” with these 
“understandings.” However, the central premise upon which the Charter’s rights protection 
regime is based—the notion that humans are autonomous agents, and that as a result of  this 
fact they possess interests in having certain things or in being free to act in various ways 
which are sufficiently weighty that it is appropriate to demand that others respect those 
interests—would have been in no such tension.   66
 Leif  Wenar, “Rights” in Edward N Nelta ed, Standford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (Standford: Metaphysics Lab Standford University, 63
2015), online: <plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/>.
 HLA Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) at 183. 64
 See Van Duffel, “The Nature of  Rights Debate Rests on a Mistake” (2012) 93 Phil Q 104; Tim Hayward, “On Prepositional Duties” (2013) 65
123 Ethics 264.
 In all of  this, of  course, we must be careful not to regard pre-contact Aboriginal society as a monolithic whole. The many Aboriginal 66
communities clearly differed from one another in countless ways. Taking all of  them together, however, its true as a general matter that these 
communities would not have found alien the idea that individual human beings are autonomous and have interests that justify holding others 
under duties to act, or refrain from acting, in certain ways.
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To summarize, we have found that, in general, traditional Aboriginal societies 
tended to be more collectivist in outlook than is the wider Canadian society today. But we 
also found that none of  these pre-contact Aboriginal communities were wholly collectivist in 
orientation, to the exclusion of  concern for individual freedom. In these traditional 
Aboriginal communities—as in both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities today—
individual autonomy was acknowledged and prized. It was not an alien value. Further, we 
found reason to believe that the notion that individuals are entitled, owing to their interests 
in personal autonomy, to be free from certain kinds of  domination would not have been 
alien to traditional Aboriginal communities either, even if  the extensive rights discourse that 
has built up around these notions in liberal democracies today would have been.  
But even if  we are wrong on that score—even if  the idea of  individual rights would 
have been completely foreign to the social understandings of  traditional Aboriginal peoples
—what does seem clear is that these notions of  individual rights are not at all foreign to 
most of  Canada’s Aboriginal peoples today. Standing on one’s legal rights and seeking their 
vindication in courts of  law was clearly not a common feature of  life in pre-contact 
Aboriginal communities. But it is not uncommon for members of  modern-day Aboriginal 
communities to do exactly this. Further, when we are assessing whether the Charter’s values 
are sufficiently foreign to certain Aboriginal communities such that the Charter’s application 
to the governments of  these communities would do violence to their way of  life, we should 
take as the society under study not some long-ago version of  the community. Rather, we 
should ask whether the Charter’s values are really alien to the community as it stands before 
us—i.e., in the present-day. Evidence suggesting that notions of  autonomy and individual 
rights would have been alien to many pre-contact Aboriginal communities—even if  it 
existed—would be rather weak evidence that these ideals are foreign to contemporary 
Aboriginal communities. This is because Aboriginal societies, like all political communities, 
naturally and inevitably change over time—even absent the assimilationist pressures of  
colonialism. As David Milward asks rhetorically in his book-length search for a “culturally 
sensitive interpretation” of  the Charter,  “[c]an any Aboriginal people (or any other society 67
for that matter) confidently assert that their laws and practices have remained exactly the 
same throughout the ages?”   68
When we turn our lens to an examination of  Aboriginal communities as we 
presently find them, we see strong evidence of  a fairly widespread endorsement of  both 
human rights in general and the Charter in particular. As Turpel conceded more than 25 years 
ago, in arguing against the propriety of  applying the Charter to inherent-right governments 
she was “faced with the fact that rights discourse has been widely appropriated by Aboriginal 
peoples in struggles against the effects of  colonialism.”  In the years since her article was 69
published, instances of  Aboriginals turning to the courts to protect their rights have, of  
course, continued apace.   70
 See Milward, supra note 8 at 62–77.67
 Ibid at 59.68
 Turpel, “Interpretive Monopolies”, supra note 20 at 10–11.69
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Aboriginal rights, R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 [Van der Peet]; R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 [Gladstone]; Pamajewon, supra note 13; 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw]; Sparrow, supra note 17; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456; Haida Nation v British 
Columbia (Minister of  Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, [2014] 2 SCR 257. Of  particular relevance for our 
purposes is McIvor v Canada (Registrar of  Indian and Northern Affairs), [2009] BCCA 153 in which an Aboriginal woman successfully invoked the 
equality provision (s. 15) of  the Charter to attack s. 6 of  the Indian Act on the grounds that it violated gender equality. That section of  the Act 
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married non-status Indian men lost their status and became unable to pass that status down to their children.
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Now, it is possible that, as Turpel alleges, Aboriginal Canadians may “appropriate 
this conceptual framework as the only (or last) resort without sharing or accepting the 
distinctly Western and liberal political vision of  human rights concepts.”  So we must be 71
careful not to automatically assume that all Aboriginal individuals who invoke the Charter (for 
instance in an attempt to avoid conviction for a criminal offence) actually endorse the view 
of  human beings as possessed of  individual rights that the Charter manifests. But we don’t 
have to merely assume that Aboriginal Canadians embrace the Charter’s values. We can 
observe this from readily available data. According to Statistics Canada, for example, 
“Aboriginal people tended to have similar views on the leading Canadian national symbols, 
with no significant differences in the proportion of  Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginal 
people who thought the Charter, flag and national anthem were very important to the 
Canadian identity.”  The same survey found that “a strong appreciation of  national symbols 72
[including the Charter] was more common among Aboriginal people than non-Aboriginal 
people born in Canada.”  By 2001, legal scholar Bradford Morse noted, in his paper “20 73
Years Under the Charter: The Status of  Aboriginal Peoples under the Canadian Charter of  
Rights and Freedoms,” that “the individual rights and liberties emphasized by the Charter are 
becoming more accepted and internalized by many Aboriginal people as the imposition of  
laws and policies by any government without their consent, including by their own 
governments, are being viewed as contrary to traditional values that stress individual freedom 
and consensus decision-making.”  The fact that “the Native Women’s Association of  74
Canada has argued strenuously for the application of  the Charter to Aboriginal 
jurisdictions”  is another prominent example of  the internalization of  individual rights 75
norms by Aboriginal Canadians.  76
 This evidence of  Aboriginal Canadians’ familiarity with and acceptance of  human 
rights norms and the Charter should be viewed against the backdrop of  another salient fact. 
Without denying the real differences that do exist between indigenous and non-indigenous 
societies, it is true that Aboriginal groups today have an incentive to over-emphasize their 
cultural distinctness. Consider the following quotation from Taiaiake Alfred, a Mohawk: “[t]o 
be Native today is to be cultured…. But we cannot have just any culture; it has to be 
“traditional” culture…. Our very sovereignty… depends on it, as we must continually prove 
 Turpel, “Interpretive Monopolies”, supra note 20 at 33.71
 See Maire Sinha, “Canadian Identity, 2013” (1 October 2013) at 8, online (pdf): Statistics Canada <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-652-72
x/89-652-x2015005-eng.htm>. (More than nine in ten Canadians surveyed believed the Charter and the flag were either very or somewhat 
important to national identity; 88% said this in respect of  the anthem.)
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 See Bradford W Morse, “Twenty Years of  Charter Protection: The Status of  Indigenous Peoples Under the Canadian Charter of  Rights and 74
Freedoms” (2002) 21 Windsor YB Access Just 385 at 430.
 Dickson, supra note 20 at 149. 75
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our difference in order to have our rights respected.”  Despite this largely judicially-created 77
phenomenon, Long and Chiste conclude that a “transformation has occurred in governing 
processes and value systems within Indian societies.”  At present, Long and Chiste 78
continue, “there appears to be a convergence of  modern Indian values and those of  Western 
liberalism around … individual rights as personal entitlements and a paralleling belief  in the 
equality of  persons.”   79
  1.   A Less Alien Alternative? 
The argument that the Charter must not apply to inherent-right governments 
because its values are too alien to those of  Aboriginal communities must therefore be 
rejected. Those who remain opposed to the Charter’s application might change tack at this 
point, however. For instance, it might be argued that to the extent that individual rights serve 
to protect citizens of  modern Western societies from abuse at the hands of  their 
governments, in traditional Aboriginal communities the internal application of  the 
community’s customary law and traditions served the same function. According to the study 
of  Plains Indian communities by Long and Chiste, for instance, these communities’ customs 
“constituted a type of  impersonal authority that served to protect individuals from arbitrary 
coercion by leaders, thereby protecting the status of  individuals within the group,” and thus 
“served as a surrogate” for the individual rights regimes opted for by “contemporary 
democratic societies.”    80
It might be argued, then, that while the Charter’s human rights values are not alien to 
Aboriginal Canadians today, there nevertheless exists an alternative method for protecting 
Aboriginals from oppression at the hands of  their inherent-right governments that is more 
in keeping with the various communities’ traditional values—indeed, one that is by definition 
consistent with and respectful of  those values. This proposal suggests that we can secure all 
the benefits of  human rights protection that the Charter’s application promises, without 
having to pay any of  the costs. That is, we can prevent the violation of  individual rights 
without having to worry about potential conflict between the Charter’s provisions and 
traditional practices, since it will be such traditional practices themselves that preclude the 
rights violations. In short, why resort to applying the Charter when the human rights of  these 
Aboriginal Canadians could be adequately safeguarded simply by letting the inherent-right 
governments use their community’s internal customs and traditions to police themselves? 
The proper response here is that we simply cannot trust inherent-right Aboriginal 
governments to self-regulate in this way. We can’t trust such Aboriginal governments to do 
so not because they are Aboriginal governments, of  course, but because they are 
governments. According to David Milward, the case for “some form of  formal rights 
protections” within Aboriginal societies is strong precisely because such formal protections 
 Supra note 48 at 66. To be clear, this unhappy situation is not the fault of  Canada’s Aboriginal communities, but rather is due to the Supreme 77
Court of  Canada’s unfortunate jurisprudence relating to Aboriginal rights since its seminal decision in Van der Peet, in which the Court found 
that Aboriginal rights are “rooted in the historical presence—the ancestry—of  aboriginal peoples in North America” (Van der Peet, supra note 
70 at para 32). See e.g. Wilkins, supra note 6 at 93–94 describing the state of  the law post-Van der Peet:  
[Aboriginal rights] exist to protect, in contemporary form, ‘the crucial elements of  those pre- 
existing aboriginal societies’ [quoting from Van der Peet]. Contemporary practices, activities and relationships qualify as protected 
uses of  aboriginal rights only where, and only because, they demonstrably keep faith with the customs, themes and traditions 
constitutive of  those cultures before and apart from European influence.  
 Turpel, “Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms”, supra note 20 at 111. 78
 Ibid at 112. Long and Chiste go on to add at 111 this endorsement of  liberal norms by Aboriginals peoples has not supplanted all traditional 79
Aboriginal values: “present-day First Nations are best characterized as unique mixtures of  traditional Indian and Western liberal values and 
institutions.” 
 Ibid at 99.80
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are “relevant to the needs and realities of  contemporary Aboriginal communities.”  For 81
Milward, while relying on customs and traditions to prevent abuses of  power may have been 
sufficient in the days before the arrival of  Europeans, “Aboriginal peoples live in a far 
different world than the one they lived in prior to contact. It is a world that is marked by 
different technologies and different economics and, therefore, one that is thoroughly 
suffused with relationships of  hierarchy and power.”  Further, Milward is surely correct 82
when he asserts that “[w]ith such relationships comes a greater potential for the abuse of  
power.”  As such, it seems totally naïve to offer an affirmative response to the rhetorical 83
question he goes on to pose: “Is it a realistic hope that any people, Aboriginal or non-
Aboriginal, can completely avoid the need for formal safeguards against governing power in 
today’s world?”  84
Now, it is not clear that it is only due to momentous changes in economic and 
governmental structures within Aboriginal communities that formal rights protection 
mechanisms are needed. Perhaps the picture painted by Long and Chiste is too rosy when 
extrapolated across all of  the various pre-contact Aboriginal peoples. Surely some of  these 
societies, at times, would have been marked by serious and enduring human rights violations. 
Perhaps some formalized practice of  overseeing decision-making for conformity with 
human rights norms would have been salutary even in these pre-contact societies. In other 
words, it seems possible that the reach of  the modern state and the shift to capitalist 
industrial economies are not necessary conditions that must be satisfied before formalized 
rights-protection mechanisms will be appropriate. It is at least arguable that we could lay out 
a list of  (jointly) sufficient conditions that omit reference to the technological sophistication 
and governing structures typical of  modern societies. Perhaps, for instance, it is appropriate 
for an independent body to scrutinize governmental decision-making for conformity with 
rights norms wherever we have reason to fear that those with decision-making power may 
advance their own interests—or those of  their friends and family—at the expense of  other 
members of  the community; or where we believe some officials may be prejudiced against 
certain members of  the community; or even where we recognize that officials will at times 
be tempted to prioritize diffuse gains in overall community well-being over the fair and just 
treatment of  each member of  the society. 
This line of  thinking is admittedly speculative and underdeveloped. The important 
point, however, is that most of  the reasons for favouring judicial review in contemporary 
non-Aboriginal contexts apply with equal force in the context of  inherent-right communities 
today. In other words, without having to isolate specific features of  present-day Aboriginal 
communities that pre-contact Aboriginal societies lacked (and the having of  which 
purportedly makes the Charter’s application appropriate), it is enough to simply notice that 
for those of  us who believe that judicial review is on balance a good thing in the broader 
Canadian society, the realities (and temptations) of  governing that we think gives rise to the 
need for such judicial review are also present in the context of  contemporary Aboriginal 
communities. 
Indeed, a number of  commentators (both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal) argue 
that modern Aboriginal governments, as compared to the federal government and the 
governments of  the provinces, are more likely to perpetrate human rights abuses. According 
 Milward, supra note 8 at 60 (emphasis added).81
 Ibid. John Borrows makes a different, although related, point when he argues that Indigenous traditions can cease to be “uplifting, positive, 82
and liberating forces” “when they are treated as timeless models of  unchanging truth that require unwavering deference and unquestioning 
obedience” (Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 2016) at i).
 Milward, supra note 8 at 61.83
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to Roger Gibbins, for example, “the Charter takes on additional importance when we realize 
that individual rights and freedoms are likely to come under greater threat from Indian 
governments than they are from other governments in Canada.”  The reason for this, 85
Gibbins clarifies, is due to “the size and homogeneity of  Indian communities rather than 
[…] their ‘Indianness’ per se. Indian communities tend to be small and characterized by 
extensive family and kinship ties, and it is in just such communities that individual rights and 
freedoms are most vulnerable.”  Milward picks up on this theme, asserting that 86
“contemporary Aboriginal communities are often characterized by strife between rival clans 
or families.”  He then explains how in such circumstances those who wield power may seek 87
to legitimize their abuse of  it by disingenuously claiming that in violating the rights of  their 
members they are in fact only acting to preserve the community’s collective traditions: “If  a 
family wrests the reins of  power for itself, that family can set the ‘collective goals’ for the 
Aboriginal community at large. The pursuit of  such ‘collective goals’ can end up leading to 
the benefit of  the dominant family and to the neglect or even persecution of  rival 
families.”  88
Ultimately, then, the claim that the Charter must not apply to inherent-right 
governments because we can reliably secure the same human rights-protecting benefits it 
offers via a less alien means is not compelling. We do not have good reason to be confident 
on this score. If, therefore, we accept that the Charter has salutary human rights-protecting 
effects, but still wish to argue that it should not apply to inherent-right governments, we will 
have to point to some countervailing downside that its application would have. We will turn 
our attention to this possibility by addressing what we might label the ‘sovereignty argument’ 
against the Charter’s application. 
 C.   The Sovereignty Argument 
The final argument against the Charter’s application to inherent-right communities 
that we will examine has it that were Aboriginal governments required to act within the 
bounds laid out by the Charter, this would unacceptably undermine Aboriginal sovereignty. 
What should we make of  this claim?  
Firstly, we should get clear on what we mean by the concept of  sovereignty. Often, 
it appears that ‘sovereignty’ is used to refer to having complete and unqualified control over 
a given jurisdiction.  Other times, however, we clearly have no qualms in referring to a body 89
as sovereign even though its powers are limited in various ways, as, for instance, when we 
speak of  the Canadian federal government as exercising sovereignty, despite the obvious fact 
that in doing so it must comply with the Charter and with the Constitution’s division of  
powers between the federal and provincial governments. Further, it is clear that Canada’s 
Aboriginal peoples do not possess “external sovereignty,” in the sense of  being sovereign 
states.  Rather, they are a part of  the Canadian state and exercise their sovereignty within it.  90
 Roger Gibbins, “Citizenship, Political, and Intergovernmental Problems with Indian Self-Government” in J. Rick Ponting, ed, Arduous 85
Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto, Ont: McClelland and Stewart 2000) at 374.
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As the majority of  the Supreme Court of  Canada wrote in Gladstone: “distinctive 
aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and economic 
community, over which the Crown is sovereign.”  A similar sentiment is expressed by 91
Binnie J. in his judgment (supported by Major J.) in the 2001 case of  Mitchell, where, drawing 
on the notion of  “shared” or “merged” sovereignty that had been advanced by the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, he wrote that “aboriginal and non-aboriginal Canadians 
together form a sovereign entity with a measure of  common purpose and united effort.”  92
Binnie J. explicitly found that assenting to this notion is necessary for “the principle of  
‘merged sovereignty’ articulated by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples […] to 
have any true meaning.”  Indeed, this ideal of  “shared” or “merged” sovereignty, as 93
opposed to external sovereignty, most aptly describes the sense in which Canada’s Aboriginal 
peoples are sovereign.   94
We should, then, echo the words of  the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples’ 
Final Report that “no sovereignty is absolute or exclusive in any federation.”  That is, while 95
we can conceive of  an absolute sovereign on the order of  Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, for 
our purposes we should not understand a sovereign political community (qua sovereign) as 
being free to exercise public power in any way it sees fit. In a constitutional democracy like 
Canada, sovereignty must be exercised in accordance with certain fundamental norms, such 
as democracy and the rule of  law.  We might wish to see these as parameters within which 96
sovereignty is to be exercised in Canada, as opposed to limitations that curtail sovereignty.  At 97
issue, then, is whether requiring inherent-right Aboriginal governments to comply with the 
Charter would be to unacceptably limit Aboriginal sovereignty, or merely to require that it be 
exercised within acceptable parameters.  
One way, it would seem, in which Aboriginal sovereignty would be unduly limited is 
if  the Charter’s application were to force Aboriginal communities to undergo profound 
cultural change. Certainly a community made to shed its culture and adopt another’s is a 
community whose status as sovereign is open to doubt. So if  complying with the Charter’s 
provisions were to require Aboriginal peoples to turn their backs on their cultural traditions 
and remake themselves in the image of  the more individualistic, rights-focused wider society, 
the requirement that they exercise self-government in accordance with the Charter would 
appear to be an unacceptable limit on, rather than merely a parameter of, their sovereignty.  
Clearly, the line between a ‘limit’ and a ‘parameter’ will be a tough one to draw in 
many cases. However, it might be that while compliance with the rule of  law, say, is an 
acceptable parameter within which Aboriginal self-government must be exercised, requiring 
compliance with the whole suite of  contemporary liberal-democratic values—such as gender 
equality, religious freedom, freedom of  expression, and the like—would be to diminish 
 Gladstone, supra note 70 at para 73.91
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Aboriginal sovereignty. The difference here would be that while notions of  the rule of  law 
are immanent in Aboriginal legal traditions—and so exercising self-government within this 
parameter would not require any dramatic alterations to an Aboriginal community’s cultural 
life—the more specific liberal values just mentioned may well come into conflict with 
cherished indigenous customs and practices, thus requiring the latter to be profoundly 
altered in order that they not fall afoul of  the former. As John Tomasi controversially puts it, 
perhaps at least some Aboriginal groups, “accidents of  geography to the contrary, are 
importantly outside of  liberalism,”  in the sense that it would be “inappropriate” to expose 98
these “aboriginal groups to the measures that would be required if  we were to insist on 
treating them as full citizens of  liberal society.”    99
For this ostensibly sovereignty-based argument against the Charter’s application to 
succeed, however, it would have to be the case that Aboriginal groups are indeed ‘outside of  
liberalism,’ in the sense of  not endorsing core liberal values. But this suggestion is just a 
slightly dressed-up version of  the ‘alien values’ argument we rejected above. Because the 
underlying values of  personal autonomy, equality, and human rights that animate liberalism 
generally and the Charter more specifically are broadly endorsed by contemporary Aboriginal 
communities, it is not the case that the Charter’s application would necessarily require a 
profound re-ordering of  the collective life of  Aboriginal societies. We must, therefore, reject 
the argument that the Charter’s application to inherent-right governments would violate 
Aboriginal sovereignty by requiring such drastic cultural change.  
Perhaps, however, the Charter’s application would violate Aboriginal sovereignty in a 
more straightforward sense—i.e., by making the exercise of  Aboriginal self-government 
beholden to a bill of  rights that, while not ‘foreign’ in the sense of  advancing values alien to 
contemporary Aboriginal peoples, is at least of  rather foreign providence, in that it was not 
created by and for the Aboriginal communities upon which it is imposed. At this point, it 
will be helpful, in order to get clearer on what a violation of  Aboriginal sovereignty might 
look like at law, to refer to the Supreme Court of  Canada’s jurisprudence on the question of  
when it is permissible to limit constitutionally guaranteed Aboriginal rights.  
Aboriginal rights are expressly “recognized and affirmed” by s. 35 of  Canada’s 
Constitution Act, 1982. While the text of  that provision provides no indication as to whether, 
or how, such Aboriginal rights could permissibly be limited by the federal or provincial 
governments, the view that s. 35 rights are absolute and subject to no limitation has been 
emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court. In the important 1990 Supreme Court decision 
in Sparrow, the Court laid out what has become known as the ‘Sparrow test’ for determining 
whether a given limitation of  a s. 35 right—including, importantly for our purposes, the 
inherent right to self-government which is understood to be encompassed by s. 35—is 
justified. The first step of  the justification test involves ascertaining whether the restriction 
on the Aboriginal right seeks to achieve a valid legislative objective. The second and final 
step requires determining whether the legislative objective has been pursued in a manner that 
upholds “the honour of  the Crown,” in the sense of  discharging its “responsibility to act in a 
fiduciary capacity with respect to aboriginal peoples.”  100
In laying out the “Sparrow test”, the Supreme Court of  Canada held that “federal 
power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconciliation is to 
demand the justification of  any government regulation that infringes upon or denies aboriginal 
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rights.”  In the Van der Peet decision in 1996, a seven-member majority of  the Supreme Court 101
of  Canada held that the underlying purpose of  s. 35(1) is to effect a reconciliation between 
Crown sovereignty on the one hand and the prior occupation of  Canada by Aboriginal peoples
—“the fact that Aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices, 
traditions and cultures”—on the other.  In this way, and returning to our earlier inquiry, 102
federal or provincial legislation will, according to Canadian law, unduly undermine a s. 35 right 
(such as the inherent right of  self-government) where the legislation would limit that right in a 
way that is inconsistent with achieving the sort of  reconciliation the Supreme Court of  Canada 
has said that s. 35 ultimately aims at. 
As will be discussed below, it is quite doubtful that the Sparrow test would apply, as a 
matter of  law, in cases where the action of  an inherent-right government is struck down for 
non-conformity with the Charter. However, I believe that turning to the logic of  the Sparrow 
test is helpful in trying to determine whether the Charter’s application to inherent-right 
governments would unduly undermine the sovereignty of  the latter. Taking the central 
question that animates the Sparrow test and applying it in the context of  the Charter’s 
application to inherent-right governments leads us to query whether the Charter’s application 
would be consistent with the effort to achieve a reconciliation of  Crown and Aboriginal 
sovereignty.  We should not, in other words, address the question of  whether the Charter’s 103
application to Aboriginal governments violates the sovereignty of  the latter in isolation. 
Rather, we must also inquire into what effect ruling out the Charter’s application would have 
on the sovereignty of  the Crown. There is thus something of  a balancing act to be 
performed; neither Crown sovereignty nor Aboriginal sovereignty is absolute, and both may 
need to be constrained in certain ways in order to harmoniously co-exist with the other.  
How are we to go about striking the balance that reconciliation requires? If  
Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty are taken as absolute, then the two things are flatly 
irreconcilable: for either sovereignty to be worthy of  the name it would not be susceptible to 
limitation by the other. However, as mentioned above, we should not understand sovereignty 
in this absolutist sense. Instead, we should regard the Crown and Aboriginal peoples as 
possessing shared, or merged, sovereignty. At the same time, while it makes sense to speak 
of  shared sovereignty, there does appear to be a zero-sum quality to sovereignty. The 
sovereignty of  the Crown does not cease just because Aboriginal nations also exercise 
sovereignty within Canada. However, the fact that Aboriginal nations exercise sovereignty—
at least within their respective jurisdictions, and in respect of  certain fields of  governance—
means that the Crown exercises less sovereignty than it otherwise would. Where two or more 
groups exercise sovereignty in a particular political community—putting aside the possibility 
of  discovering new territories or opening up new legislative fields—an increase in one party’s 
sovereignty will mean a decrease in the other’s.   104
This zero-sum quality is important for the following reason. The Canadian Charter is 
the product of  the Crown exercising its sovereign authority to lay down laws of  
constitutional status. To say that it should not to apply to all orders of  government within 
the boundaries of  the Canadian state can, therefore, reasonably be seen as advocating for a 
limit on Crown sovereignty. That is, to limit the range of  governments to which the Charter 
 Ibid at para 62 (QL).101
 Van der Peet, supra note 70 at para 31.102
 Shortly below, we will question whether these respective sovereignties are in fact what we should understand s. 35 as seeking to reconcile.103
 To be clear, what I am claiming is that sovereignty admits of  degrees. That is, where a body fails to possess a threshold level of  legitimate 104
law-making authority, then that body is not sovereign. But it is also true that law-making bodies will vary in how far above that threshold they 
fall, with those far above the threshold exercising more sovereignty than those just barely above it.
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applies, given that it is the product of  an exercise of  Crown sovereignty, is ipso facto to limit 
Crown sovereignty itself. At the same time, however, to apply the Charter to inherent-right 
governments and thereby constrain the way in which these governments can exercise their 
sovereignty is to limit that sovereignty. The question is thus: what would best achieve a 
reconciliation of  Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty—requiring inherent-right governments 
to operate in accordance with the Charter, or allowing them to exercise self-government free 
from the Charter’s constraints? 
On the whole, I believe that such reconciliation would be best achieved by allowing 
inherent-right governments to operate free from Charter scrutiny. That the Canadian Charter
—again, a product of  the exercise of  Crown sovereignty—should apply in inherent-right 
communities and thereby continuously restrict the way in which those communities’ 
governments can exercise their constitutional right to self-government would be a far greater 
and more direct limitation on Aboriginal sovereignty than would be the impairment of  
Crown sovereignty were the Charter deemed inapplicable to inherent-right governments. If  
our objective is to reconcile these two sovereignties, and if  regardless of  whether we accept 
or reject the Charter’s application to inherent-right governments we will have to abide some 
curtailment of  either Crown or Aboriginal sovereignty, then we should simply choose the 
lesser evil, so to speak. That is, if  Option 1 would limit Aboriginal sovereignty quite 
significantly and Crown sovereignty not at all, and Option 2 would limit Crown sovereignty 
rather marginally and Aboriginal sovereignty not at all, we should show favouritism to 
neither Crown nor Aboriginal sovereignty per se, and should instead select Option 2 on the 
grounds that the limitation on sovereignty (of  either sort) that we will thereby bring about is 
less than that which would be brought about were we to choose the other option. 
It might be argued, however, that having the Charter apply to inherent-right 
governments actually represents a more natural equilibrium point, from the point of  view of  
a concern for an equitable reconciliation of  Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty. For instance, 
it might be pointed out that the Charter already constrains the exercise of  Crown sovereignty, 
by requiring that federal and provincial government legislation accord with the Charter’s 
rights and freedoms in order to be legally valid. On this view, since the Charter already limits 
Crown sovereignty, it is right and proper, and fully in keeping with a two-way process of  
reconciliation, for it to likewise constrain the exercise of  Aboriginal sovereignty. The flaw in 
this line of  thinking, however, is that the Charter is itself  an exercise of  Crown, and not 
Aboriginal, sovereignty. Thus, while Crown sovereignty is in a real sense limited by the 
Charter, this limitation is a self-imposed one. The same could obviously not be said of  the 
limitation on Aboriginal sovereignty that the Charter’s application to inherent-right 
governments would occasion. 
Alternatively, it might be noted that at present Crown sovereignty is constrained by 
the need to respect those Aboriginal rights guaranteed by the Constitution (whose 
impairment is held to be justified only where the Sparrow test is met). Further, we can 
observe that the legal test for whether an Aboriginal right is made out—the Van der Peet test, 
named after the Supreme Court of  Canada decision in which it was first articulated—
focuses on whether the activity that an Aboriginal group is claiming a right to engage in is an 
“element of  a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of  the 
aboriginal group claiming the right,”  and requires that “the practices, customs and 105
traditions which constitute aboriginal rights are those which have continuity with the 
practices, customs and traditions that existed prior to contact.”  Since we can see the 106
particular culture of  any given pre-contact society as a function of  the way in which it chose 
 Van der Peet, supra note 70 at para 46.105
 Ibid at para 59.106
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to exercise its sovereignty, it does not seem too much of  a stretch to say that Crown 
sovereignty is already, to an extent, constrained by the exercise of  Aboriginal sovereignty.  107
That is, Crown sovereignty, under the Sparrow test, may only be exercised in ways consistent 
with respect for Aboriginal rights, and these rights are in turn ascertained (pursuant to the 
Van der Peet test) with reference to how Aboriginal sovereignty was exercised. These facts 
might, therefore, be marshalled to support the following conclusion: requiring Aboriginal 
sovereignty to be exercised in a manner consistent with Crown sovereignty, which is what the 
Charter’s application to inherent-right communities would amount to, is demanded by simple 
reciprocity.  
This argument must be rejected, however. Not only, as mentioned above, would 
requiring inherent-right governments to exercise their sovereignty only in accordance with 
the Charter be a far greater limitation on Aboriginal sovereignty than is demanding that the 
Crown not exercise its sovereignty in ways that violate the special rights of  Aboriginal 
peoples, but there is already the right sort of  reciprocity in place. For instance, it is true that 
Aboriginal rights are understood under Canadian law as entitlements held by Aboriginals 
(both individual Aboriginals and Aboriginal collectives), in virtue of  their being 
Aboriginal.  We would have the appropriate analogue, then, of  the way in which Crown 108
sovereignty is constrained by the special rights of  Aboriginal peoples qua Aboriginals, if  it 
were the case that Aboriginal sovereignty is similarly constrained by special rights held by the 
Crown qua Crown. And that is in fact the case. Specifically, Aboriginal sovereignty cannot be 
exercised in a manner inconsistent with the Crown’s sui generis ‘right’ to exercise what are 
known as “Crown prerogatives” (or “royal prerogatives”). No Aboriginal nation, for 
example, can declare that Canada is at war, or deny a particular person a Canadian passport. 
With this in mind, we must conclude again that exempting inherent-right governments from 
the requirement to operate in compliance with the Charter would be consistent with an 
equitable, two-way attempt to achieve a reconciliation of  Crown sovereignty and Aboriginal 
sovereignty.   109
IV.    Rethinking Reconciliation 
Above, we considered whether the application of  the Charter to inherent-right 
governments is appropriate in light of  an understanding that the Aboriginal right of  self-
government enshrined by s. 35(1) aims to reconcile Aboriginal sovereignty with the 
 This is what Paul LAH Chartrand, “Reconciling Indigenous Peoples’ Sovereignty and State Sovereignty” (23 July 2018), online (pdf): 107
Australian Institute of  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies <aiatsis.gov.au/sites/default/files/products/discussion_paper/
chartrandp-dp26-reconciling-indigenous-peoples-sovereignty-state-sovereignty_0.pdf> seems to have in mind when he writes at 16 that “the 
political action of  Aboriginal peoples matters in law and politics. The political action mattered historically, and thereby the interests of  
Aboriginal peoples crystallized into rights recognisable and enforceable within the Canadian and Australian legal systems.” That is, ‘political’ 
decisions by Aboriginal peoples today, about how or whether to keep up and regulate an activity with pre-contact roots integral to the group’s 
distinctive culture, will “inform the dynamic evolution of  the law of  the constitution of  Canada” (at 12).
 See Van der Peet, supra note 70 at para 19: “Although equal in importance and significance to the rights enshrined in the Charter, aboriginal 108
rights must be viewed differently from Charter rights because they are rights held only by aboriginal members of  Canadian society. They arise 
from the fact that aboriginal people are aboriginal.” (Emphasis in original.) See also Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 
66:4 Can Bar Rev 727 at 776; Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, “Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. 
Sparrow” (1991) 29:2 Alta L Rev 498 at 498–502.
 Glen Coulthard has written passionately to warn that attempts at ‘reconciliation’ and securing ‘recognition’ of  Indigenous difference are 109
wrongheaded as they actually do violence to indigeneity, and involve an ultimately degrading process of  seeking appreciation from the 
perpetrators of  colonialism (See Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of  Recognition (Minneapolis: University 
of  Minnesota Press, 2014)). To be clear, I am insisting that reconciliation must be a genuinely mutual, two-way process, involving a search for a 
way forward that is conducted jointly by parties that already appreciate and respect the other party, as evidenced by recognition on the part of  
both parties that there exist significant cultural and even epistemological differences between them that are not to be eliminated, but rather 
bridged in a spirit of  acceptance.
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sovereignty of  the Crown. This view of  what it is that s. 35(1) seeks to reconcile is open to 
question, however. A look at the Supreme Court of  Canada case law, for instance, reveals 
that there has been considerable evolution on this issue.  In the Sparrow decision of  1990 110
that we have already mentioned, the Court writes that “federal power must be reconciled 
with federal duty.”  Aboriginal sovereignty per se does not factor in at all under this 111
formulation, and Aboriginal rights generally are only relevant to the reconciliation process in 
so far as the Crown is under a ‘federal duty’ to respect them.  This unsatisfactory 112
conception of  reconciliation was revised in the 1996 Van der Peet decision, in which the 
Court stated that s. 35(1) aims for the “reconciliation of  the pre-existence of  aboriginal 
societies with the sovereignty of  the Crown”.  The Court’s judgment in Gladstone, also 113
handed down in 1996, offered a more expansive view of  reconciliation. In that case, Lamer 
C.J.’s judgment for the majority, although it also spoke of  “the reconciliation of  aboriginal 
societies with the broader political community of  which they are part,”  stated that what s. 114
35(1) seeks to reconcile is “the existence of  distinctive aboriginal societies prior to the arrival 
of  Europeans in North America with the assertion of  Crown sovereignty over that territory.”  115
According to one commentator, in so doing, “the Gladstone Court sli[d] into” an 
understanding of  reconciliation as “what might be termed ‘social reconciliation’.”   116
The emphasis on a wide-ranging ‘social reconciliation’ of  Aboriginal prior 
occupation and the assertion of  Crown sovereignty might seem to be in keeping with a clear-
eyed view of  the pervasive disharmony between the Crown and Aboriginal nations. 
However, the aptness of  the descriptor ‘social reconciliation’ really lies in the extent to which 
the Gladstone articulation of  reconciliation opened the door to a very wide range of  social 
policies being regarded as potentially capable of  overriding Aboriginal rights. For example, 
the Court in Gladstone held that Aboriginal rights needed to be weighed against “objectives 
such as the pursuit of  economic and regional fairness, and the recognition of  the historical 
reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by non-aboriginal groups,”  as well as 117
environmental conservation.  Moreover, the Court made clear, “[i]n the right circumstances, such 118
objectives are in the interest of  all Canadians and, more importantly, the reconciliation of  
aboriginal societies with the rest of  Canadian society may well depend on their successful 
attainment.”  119
 As Dwight Newman observes, “there is actually a set of  conceptions, in the plural, of  ‘reconciliation’ being applied in case law on section 110
35” (Newman, “Reconciliation: Legal Conception(s) and Faces of  Justice,” in John D Whyte & Saskatchewan Institute of  Public Policy, Moving 
Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich Publications, 2008) at 80).
 Sparrow, supra note 17 at para 62 (QL).111
 The minority judgment of  Major and Binnie JJ. in Mitchell, supra note 92 at para 129, however, suggests that what is to be reconciled is 112
Crown sovereignty and Aboriginal rights. That judgment also asserts, however, that “the purpose of  s. 35(1)” is “the reconciliation of  the 
interests of  aboriginal peoples with Canadian sovereignty” (para 164; emphasis added), while at the same time describing “reconciliation of  
aboriginal peoples with Canadian sovereignty” as “the purpose that lies at the heart of  s. 35(1)” (para 74).
 Van der Peet, supra note 70 at para 31.113
 Gladstone, supra note 70 at para 73.114
 Ibid. This is in fact in line with what was said at para 43 of  the majority decision in Van der Peet, supra note 71 at para 43: “prior occupation is 115
[to be] reconciled with the assertion of  Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory.” Similar language can be found in R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 
101, 138 DLR (4th) 657 at para 57, and Delgamuukw, supra note 70 at para 81, and again in Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney 
General), [2013] 1 SCR 623, 355 DLR (4th) 577 at para 66. On the divergent understandings of  reconciliation advanced by Lamer C.J. and 
McLachlin J. (as she then was) in the Sparrow, Van der Peet, and Gladstone decisions, see Kent McNeil, “Reconciliation and the Supreme Court: 
The Opposing Views of  Chief  Justices Lamer and McLachlin” (2003) 2:1 Indigenous L J 1 [McNeil]. 
 Rarihokwats, “Reconciliation: Resolving Conflict Between Two Absolute but Opposing Rights: Indigenous Nation ‘Sovereignty’ vs. Crown 116
‘Sovereignty’” (23 July 2018), online: <www.academia.edu/21858174/
Reconciliation_Indigenous_Nation_Sovereignty_v._Crown_Sovereignty>.
 Gladstone, supra note 71 at para 75.117
 Ibid at paras 55–69.118
 Ibid at para 75 (emphasis in original).119
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With a greater willingness in legal and governmental circles to accept that a right of  
Aboriginal self-government is encompassed by s. 35, the conception of  reconciliation 
animating the Supreme Court’s s. 35 jurisprudence began to place greater emphasis on 
Aboriginal sovereignty. The fact that distinctive communities of  Aboriginal peoples occupied 
what is now Canada long before contact with Europeans shows that these Aboriginal 
communities were at the time sovereign over their lands. Further, in very many cases this 
sovereignty was not yielded up to the Crown, either by treaty or conquest. In the result, 
Aboriginal sovereignty remains something that has to be reckoned with today.  The 120
strongest iteration of  this view by the Supreme Court of  Canada probably came in the Haida 
Nation case of  2004, in which the Court found that “[t]reaties serve to reconcile pre-existing 
Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty.”  That case also cited Van der Peet, 121
however, for the proposition that we should aim for “the reconciliation of  the pre-existence 
of  aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of  the Crown.”  The divergence in these two 122
quotations reveals that the Haida decision vacillates on the issue of  what to reconcile. Is it 
pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty and asserted Crown sovereignty, or merely the pre-
existence of  Aboriginal peoples and actual Crown sovereignty? The former Dean of  the 
University of  New Brunswick’s law school, Ian Peach, places emphasis on the former 
formulation, describing it as a “statement […] that it is pre-existing Indigenous sovereignty 
that is to be reconciled with assumed Crown sovereignty.”  123
Further divergent statements about what exactly is to be reconciled in order to 
achieve the promise of  s. 35(1) can also be found in other Supreme Court decisions. In the 
2001 Mitchell decision, for instance, the Court speaks of  reconciling “the interests of  
aboriginal peoples with Canadian sovereignty,”  and asserts that “the objective of  124
reconciliation  of  aboriginal peoples with Canadian sovereignty […], as established by 
the Van der Peet trilogy, is the purpose that lies at the heart of s. 35(1).”  In Taku River, in 125
language very similar to that used in Haida Nation, the Court identifies the purpose of  s. 
35(1) as “facilitat[ing] the ultimate reconciliation of  prior Aboriginal occupation with de facto 
Crown sovereignty.”  The very first sentence of  the 2005 Mikisew decision, written by 126
Binnie J. on behalf  of  a unanimous bench, boldly states that “[t]he fundamental objective of  
the modern law of  aboriginal and treaty rights is the reconciliation of  aboriginal peoples and 
non-aboriginal peoples and their respective claims, interests and ambitions.”  A helpful way 127
to understand what’s going on in the Supreme Court of  Canada’s various descriptions of  the 
reconciliation that s. 35(1) strives to advance might be to look to the words of  British 
Columbia Supreme Court Justice D.H. Vickers, who explained in the course of  his judgment 
in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia  (from which an appeal was later heard by the 128
 For an extended argument that such a reckoning with Aboriginal sovereignty is a necessary in order to make reconciliation, grounded in 120
notions of  equality and shared sovereignty, possible, see Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties, Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native 
Law Centre, 2012). 
 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of  Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511 at para 20 (emphasis added).121
 Ibid at para 17.122
 Peach, supra note 13 at 1.123
 Mitchell, supra note 93 at para 164.124
 Ibid at para 74.125
 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 SCR 550 at para 42. As Mark D. Walters has noted 126
recently, “[w]hat the Supreme Court of  Canada really meant by the idea that 
Aboriginal sovereignty is de jure and Crown sovereignty is de facto must await further analysis” (“‘Looking for a Knot in the Bulrush’: 
Reflections on Law, Sovereignty, and Aboriginal Rights” in Patrick Macklem and Douglas Sanderson, eds, From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays 
on the Constitutional Entrenchment of  Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 2016) 62.
 Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of  Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 SCR 388 at para 1.127
 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 Vickers J.128
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Supreme Court of  Canada) that the conception of  reconciliation propounded by Lamer C.J. 
in Van der Peet “re-interpreted the Sparrow theory of  reconciliation (a means to reconcile 
constitutional recognition of  Aboriginal rights with federal legislative power) as a means to 
work out the appropriate place of  Aboriginal people within the Canadian state.”  129
So which view of  reconciliation should we take? What precisely ought we to see as 
being in need of  reconciliation? As a first step towards answering these questions, it will be 
helpful to develop a better understanding of  what the concept of  reconciliation entails. On 
this subject, legal scholar Mark Walters suggests that reconciliation involves “finding within, 
or bringing to, a situation of  discordance a sense of  harmony.”  He argues that we can 130
understand reconciliation in three different senses: reconciliation as resignation (in the sense 
of  “accepting or being resigned to a certain state of  affairs that is unwelcome but beyond 
[one’s] control,”  reconciliation as consistency (for example rendering inconsistent entries 131
in a financial accounting book consistent) and reconciliation as relationship (for example the 
“reconciliation of  spouses after a period of  separation” ). For Walters, reconciliation as 132
relationship, “unlike the other two forms of  reconciliation, is always, to a certain extent, two-
sided or reciprocal.”  It “invariably… involves sincere acts of  mutual respect, tolerance, 133
and goodwill that serve to heal rifts and create the foundations for a harmonious 
relationship.”    134
When it comes to reconciling Crown sovereignty and Aboriginal sovereignty, what 
we should be aiming for is reconciliation as relationship. For our purposes, this is clearly the 
most normatively attractive of  the three species of  reconciliation.  That is, the 135
reconciliation we are aiming to effect is very much reconciliation between partners in a 
relationship. We are trying to reconcile two sovereign communities united together in a single 
state, rather than two apparently discrepant entries in an accounting book. Similarly, the aim 
is not to have Aboriginal Canadians merely resign themselves to the denial of  Aboriginal 
sovereignty and the violations of  Aboriginals’ human rights that occurred in the past, but to 
establish a basis upon which the Canadian state and its Aboriginal peoples can move forward 
together in conditions of  justice and mutual respect. In short, we should strive to achieve 
reconciliation as relationship and should aim, along the way, at reconciliation as resignation 
or as consistency only insofar as these latter two species of  reconciliation help us to achieve 
reconciliation of  the former sort.   136
 Ibid at para 1345 and 1358.129
 Mark D Walters, “The Jurisprudence of  Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir, eds, The Politics of  130
Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 167.
 Ibid.131
 Ibid.132
 Ibid at 168.133
 Ibid.134
 It is, however, open to question whether this is the sort of  reconciliation that is actually closest in spirit to the vision of  a reconciled 135
Canada that the Supreme Court invokes in its s. 35 jurisprudence. See e.g. Walters’s view that the Supreme Court of  Canada’s jurisprudence on 
reconciliation invokes a conception of  reconciliation as consistency, albeit while “manifest[ing] some evidence of  reconciliation as relationship 
as a normative principle” (ibid at180), and his contention (ibid at 181) that the Supreme Court employed a conception of  reconciliation as 
consistency in Marshall, supra note 70; R v Bernard, [2005] 2 SCR 220. See also Newman, supra note 110 at 80. 
 Of  course, much and indeed most of  the work required to achieve a reconciliation of  the relationship between the Canadian state and its 136
Aboriginal peoples will take place outside of  the legal system. McNeil, for instance, (supra note 115 at 23) reads the decision of  McLachlin J. 
(as she then was) in Van der Peet as showing that she was “adamant that the way to reconciliation is through the consensual treaty process.”  
Ultimately, the reconciliation process, as Walters, supra note 127, at 175 notes, should be one of  “re-establishing relationships of  trust, honour, 
respect, and tolerance between vastly different peoples at all levels, from individuals to local communities to governments.”
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Having sharpened our understanding of  the general concept of  reconciliation, we 
can return to our earlier question: what precisely should we see s. 35 as aiming to reconcile? I 
believe that, as Vickers J. suggests, what we should wish to accomplish, and what we should 
regard as the underlying objective of  s. 35(1), is nothing less than “work[ing] out the 
appropriate place of  Aboriginal people within the Canadian state.”  That is, we should 137
strive to reconcile Aboriginal peoples writ large (and not merely the sovereignty that is a 
feature of  Aboriginal nations) with the Canadian state writ large (and not merely the fact of  
Crown sovereignty that is a feature of  the Canadian state).  
Why should we aim for reconciliation of  this sort, as opposed to, say, the 
reconciliation of  Aboriginal sovereignty and Crown sovereignty, or the reconciliation of  
Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal peoples? The reason that it is preferable to regard s. 
35(1) as striving for reconciliation between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state, as 
opposed to reconciling two apparently competing sovereignties, is that achieving the former 
sort of  reconciliation affords a firmer basis for an enduring and inclusive Canadian identity 
that is shared by and reflective of  Canada’s Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities. 
Merely reconciling Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty, for instance, does little, in itself, to 
ensure that Aboriginal peoples and the Crown can work together in common cause.  It 138
seems correct, for example, to regard Canadian sovereignty as at present perfectly 
‘reconciled’ with German sovereignty, and yet what clearly distinguishes the relationship 
between the Canadian and German states on the one hand, and that between the Canadian 
state and its Aboriginal peoples on the other, is that Canada’s Aboriginal nations are not 
external sovereigns but rather part of  the Canadian state itself.  
Similarly, it is preferable to regard s. 35(1) as striving for a reconciliation between 
Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state, as opposed to reconciling Canada’s Aboriginal 
peoples with its non-Aboriginal peoples (as suggested in Mikisew), because the latter directive 
fails to sufficiently acknowledge the way in which Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples, 
while culturally distinct in important ways, at the same time also comprise one people and 
one political community.  What is required, then, is to reconcile the state of  Canada with a 139
long marginalized and disrespected segment of  its populace. We should strive to achieve a 
reconciliation between Canada’s Aboriginal peoples and a Canadian state that, despite 
simultaneously demanding their loyalty and obedience, has historically oppressed those 
peoples.   
 A.   Is the Charter’s Application Consistent with an Expansive View of  Reconciliation?  
As we saw, the Charter’s application to inherent-right governments would amount to 
a limitation on the s. 35 right of  Aboriginal self-government. We should ask, however, 
whether the Charter’s application to such governments is nevertheless consistent with the 
reconciliation objective animating s. 35(1), once that reconciliation is conceived of  as a 
reconciliation between the Canadian state and its Aboriginal peoples. I believe the answer to 
this question is yes. If  our concern were merely to achieve a balanced reconciliation of  
Aboriginal and Crown sovereignty, we should conclude that inherent-right governments 
should be free to exercise self-government without being subject to Charter scrutiny, whereas 
the federal and provincial governments, and Aboriginal governments exercising delegated 
 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 128, at para 1345 (drawing on the words of  Gordon Christie, “Aboriginality and Normativity: Judicial 137
Justification of  Recent Developments in Aboriginal Law” (2002) 17 Can J L & Soc 41 at 69–70).
 As Binnie J. wrote in Mitchell, supra note 93 at para 133, “The constitutional objective is reconciliation not mutual isolation.”138
 This idea of  partnership is caught by the Lamer formulation of  reconciliation of  “aboriginal societies with the broader political community 139
of  which they are part.” (My talk of  ‘the Canadian state’ and its central ‘institutions’ can be regarded as simply a further elaboration of  what 
Lamer C.J. referred to as the Canadian ‘political community’.)
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powers, or exercising self-government pursuant to a negotiated agreement explicitly 
providing for the Charter’s application, should be subject to the Charter. However, when it 
comes to the goal of  reconciling Aboriginal peoples with the Canadian state, the Charter’s 
application to inherent-right governments would on the whole advance rather than 
undermine that objective. 
The main reason for this is because of  the simple fact that the Charter is a central 
feature of  the fundamental architecture of  the Canadian state. It is not only legally 
entrenched in the Constitution but is also, as noted above, now firmly entrenched in the 
minds of  most Canadians as a central part of  what it means to be Canadian. The Charter 
today pervades legal and political decision-making; its provisions are top of  mind among 
policy-makers and legislative drafters. It is used to interrogate huge swathes of  Canadian law. 
Further, its values have, by a kind of  osmosis that goes beyond the direct application of  the 
Charter’s text by courts, and even beyond the pre-emptive shaping of  legislation at the 
drafting stage in order to avoid the courts striking down portions of  the law for non-
conformity with the Charter, impacted Canadian society and politics in myriad ways.  It 140
would be strange, therefore, to claim that the Constitution’s guarantee of  Aboriginal rights in 
s. 35 should be interpreted in such a way as to advance a reconciliation of  Aboriginal peoples 
and the Canadian state, and then claim that we needn’t strive for a reconciliation of  
Aboriginal self-government and a key part of  the basic law—i.e., the Constitution—that lays 
out the fundamental structure of  that very state.  141
It is highly instructive to note, furthermore, that s. 35 of  the Constitution Act, 1982 
does not contain a limitations clause similar to the Charter’s s. 1. A logically plausible 
interpretation of  s. 35, therefore, would be that the Aboriginal rights that the section 
‘recognizes and affirms’ are absolute and not subject to any limitations. Of  course, the 
Supreme Court decided otherwise when it essentially read in a limitations clause in the 
course of  articulating the Sparrow test. Given that the Court in Sparrow decided to go beyond 
the text of  s. 35 and hold the Aboriginal rights contemplated therein to be subject to 
limitation in order to achieve ‘valid legislative objectives’, we can expect that it will find—
and, in the name of  consistency, it should find—that the s. 35 right of  self-government is 
also subject to limitation in order to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms the Charter 
enumerates.  142
V.   Section 1 and a Flexible Application of  the Charter 
We have found, then, that it is appropriate, and consistent with the objective of  
reconciling Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state of  which they are a part, for the 
Charter to apply to inherent-right governments. An important part of  the process of  
applying the Charter in real-world cases is of  course the s. 1 inquiry. That is, where some 
action by an inherent-right government is alleged to violate a Charter right, the Aboriginal 
government will be provided an opportunity (pursuant to s. 1 of  the Charter) to prove to a 
 One example of  this is the way in which Canadian administrative law doctrine requires administrative action to comport with “Charter 140
values” (Doré v Barreau du Québec, [2012] 1 SCR 395).
 It is important to note that I am not claiming that wherever an Aboriginal right is exercised in such a way as to violate a Charter right, the 141
Charter right must always be vindicated and the Aboriginal right limited. It is possible, for instance, that the objective of  reconciliation might 
recommend that a treaty right, say, should prevail even where its exercise has led to a violation of  a Charter right.
 While the Supreme Court of  Canada has not yet been called upon to do so, the Court has gone out of  its way not to read s. 25 of  the 142
Charter as straightforwardly ousting Charter review of  those s. 35 Aboriginal rights also contemplated by s. 25 (see Kapp, supra note 13). Further, 
as observed above, all of  the noises emanating from the Supreme Court of  Canada on the question of  how to interpret s. 25 appear to be “in 
favour of  the Charter’s having some application to Aboriginal governments” (Milward, supra note 9, at 66).
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reviewing court that the action in question amounts to a reasonable limit on the relevant 
Charter right. Even so, we might harbour a lingering sense that the Charter’s application in 
inherent-right communities could do cultural violence to these societies.  
At this point, it would be helpful to get clear on exactly which rights, if  enforced 
against particular Aboriginal governments, will cause social disruption, and what the scope 
of  such disruption is likely to be. Critics of  the Charter’s application disappoint on this 
score.  However, there are a few specific Charter provisions that are identified in the 143
literature as being especially problematic, and these do suggest that applying the Charter to 
inherent-right governments in the same way that it is applied to other levels of  government 
could cause special hardship for Aboriginal communities. For instance, Kerry Wilkins gives 
the examples of  s. 6 and s. 11(d) of  the Charter. Section 11(d) guarantees the right of  all 
Canadians to an independent and impartial adjudication of  their case if  charged with an 
offence. Section 6, according to Wilkins, “could give to any Canadian citizen or permanent 
resident the constitutional right to take up residency and work at any time in any inherent-
right community, subject only to general community rules and reasonable residency 
requirements.”  Wilkins argues, however, that if  inherent-right governments were required 144
to act in accordance with s. 6, the result could be the exposure of  Aboriginal “communities’ 
unique and fragile traditions to still further pressures from the mainstream cultures that most 
new residents would bring with them when they took up residence.”  As for the guarantees 145
of  independence and impartiality in s. 11(d), Wilkins admits that these are “absolutely 
essential” “[w]ithin the mainstream system,”  but warns that they could have disastrous 146
consequences for Aboriginal dispute resolution. Specifically, Wilkins notes that “[f]rom the 
standpoint of  traditional aboriginal justice,” the very attribute of  detached independence 
given so much weight by the mainstream justice system, “would disqualify someone from 
making any useful or authoritative contribution to the task” of  conflict resolution.  Since 147
traditional Aboriginal notions of  discipline and dispute resolution conceive of  wrongdoing 
as incidents of  community disharmony, and thus are often seen to require that community 
elders involved in resolving disputes be personally acquainted with “the histories and 
personal circumstances”  of  all involved, to insist instead that adjudicators within these 148
communities be entirely independent of  the parties “would very probably undermine and 
transform the entire basis of  internal community discipline.”   149
We might label the larger argument being made here, in line with Patrick Macklem’s 
summary of  it, as the “rigid analytic grid” argument. According to Macklem: 
…the Charter does pose a risk to the continued vitality of  indigenous difference. 
The Charter enables litigants to constitutionally interrogate the rich complexity of  
Aboriginal societies according to a rigid analytic grid of  individual right and state 
 But see Russell, supra note 20 (itemizes for consideration section 3 of  the Charter and its application to “clan mother elections”, as well as 143
the Charter’s “double jeopardy clause” and its “insulat[ing an individual] from having to speak on his or her behalf  in court” at 183).  
 Supra note 6 at 85. (As it happens, this appears to be a misreading of  s. 6(2) of  the Charter, which grants to every Canadian citizen and 144
permanent resident the right “to move to and take up residence in any province” (emphasis added). The section on its face says nothing about 
Canadians possessing a right to take up residence in particular communities within the provinces).
 Ibid.145
 Ibid at 92.146
 Ibid at 93.147
 Ibid at 91.148
 Ibid at 93.149
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obligation. It authorizes judicial reorganization of  Aboriginal societies according to 
non-Aboriginal values.   150
I believe that the rigid analytic grid argument, properly understood, does have considerable 
force, since applying the Charter to Aboriginal governments in exactly the same way that it is 
enforced against the governments of  Canada and the provinces could indeed require 
Aboriginal communities to significantly alter their traditional practices and customs in order 
to accord with Charter jurisprudence regarding how basic liberties should be protected. 
What reason might we have for such a fear, in light of  all we said above about 
Aboriginal peoples today embracing ideals of  personal autonomy and, according to a 
preponderance of  available evidence, generally embracing the Charter itself ? The correct 
response here is to distinguish between a commitment to personal autonomy and the 
Charter’s values, on the one hand, and a commitment to the entire litany of  rights set out by 
the Charter, and the surrounding jurisprudence over the precise contours of  these rights, on 
the other. Simply put, the Charter is not just an autonomy-securing document. The specific 
formulation of  rights contained in the Charter is not the one true articulation of  a 
commitment to individual autonomy and basic human rights; the latter does not lead 
ineluctably to the former. As Joseph Carens observes, for example, “[t]he Charter is not 
something that directly translates abstract individual rights into social realities. It is not 
applied liberalism, pure and simple […].”   151
Claiming that there is a ‘rigidity’ to the Charter (and how it is applied to the federal 
and provincial governments) allows us to see that imposing it on Aboriginal governments in 
exactly the same way it is currently applied to the other levels of  government can be 
problematic. However, it is important not to take this concern with the Charter as a rigid 
analytic grid too far. As an argument that the Charter should not apply at all to inherent-right 
governments, for instance, it has much in common with the alien values argument we 
explored in great detail above. To the extent that Macklem’s assertion might be used to 
suggest that the entire conceptual framework of  individual rights is foreign to Aboriginal 
societies, we will proceed on the grounds that this claim was successfully refuted above. The 
rigid analytic grid argument should therefore not be seen as proving that the Charter can have 
no application to inherent-right governments without destroying Aboriginal difference. For all 
the reasons already canvassed, that is not the proper conclusion to draw. A sensible middle-
ground is to argue that the Charter should be flexibly applied to inherent-right Aboriginal 
governments.   
Precisely how, then, should s. 1 be applied so as to, in the language of  David 
Milward, “realize a culturally sensitive interpretation” of  the Charter?  Might it not even be 152
optimistic to the point of  naiveté to believe that Canadian courts—being institutions 
deliberately constructed so as to mirror European courts, and staffed overwhelmingly by 
non-Aboriginal judges—could apply the reasonable limits test in such a way as to give 
adequate weight to the cultural practices and beliefs that animate the relevant Aboriginal 
government’s impugned action? 
Clearly, when it comes to navigating an appropriate path between the Charter’s 
human rights protections and the Aboriginal sovereignty that forms the basis of  the 
 Supra note 8 at 195.150
 Supra note 43 at 192.151
 Supra note 9 at 62–77.152
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Constitution’s guarantee of  the Aboriginal right of  self-government, the s. 1 analysis—an 
analysis of  whether governmental action found to impair a Charter right or freedom 
nevertheless constitutes a reasonable limit on that right or freedom pursuant to the so-called 
Oakes test that was formulated for this purpose by the Supreme Court of  Canada in 1986 in 
R v Oakes—is essentially where the rubber meets the road. And admittedly, the argument that 
reconciliation is best advanced by applying the Charter to Aboriginal governments places a 
considerable amount of  faith in the ability of  the s. 1 inquiry to navigate this slippery terrain. 
That faith, however, is not misplaced. The main reason this is so is because the Oakes test 
already mandates a contextual inquiry into the circumstances in which, and reasons for 
which, the impugned governmental action was taken.  This is precisely what is required in 153
order to ensure that courts pay due regard to the values and traditions that inherent-right 
governments may seek to advance by way of  action that limits Charter rights.  
For example, under the first prong of  the Oakes test, courts must begin their analysis 
of  whether a limitation on a Charter right is “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”  by asking whether the objective behind the governmental action is “pressing and 154
substantial.”  This stage of  the Oakes test allows for a contextual inquiry not only into the 155
specific intentions animating the relevant Aboriginal government, but also into the specific 
community at issue. Section 1, which contemplates some limits on Charter rights as being 
reasonable in a free and democratic society, should thus not be read as referring only to the 
wider, non-Aboriginal free and democratic society. Rather, in determining whether some 
Aboriginal government’s action, which has limited a Charter right, is ‘pressing and 
substantial’, we should have regard to the beliefs and cultural practices that characterize the 
particular community in question. We should ask whether the objective is a pressing and 
substantial one for the leaders of  a community that instantiates those beliefs and those 
practices and which is at the same time a part of  the larger Canadian political community. In 
this way, the inquiry into whether a given limitation of  a Charter right is ‘demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society’ will take as its subject of  analysis an appropriately 
particular, contextualized ‘free and democratic society’. 
What this means, in practice, is that we should be open to the possibility that a 
measure taken by a given inherent-right government, and which imposes a limit on Charter 
right, may rightly be held to be a reasonable limit on that right, whereas were the federal or a 
provincial government to implement the same measure, it would thereby unreasonably limit 
the relevant Charter right.  The reason that we should accept this state of  affairs, of  course, 156
is due to the fact that prevailing community beliefs and practices will vary depending upon 
which community within Canada we have in mind. This being the case, and in light of  the 
fact that a particular community’s norms and traditions are relevant to the question of  
whether the objective behind some act of  the community’s government is pressing and 
substantial, it follows that a governmental action that would be an unjustified violation of  a 
Charter right in the context of  one community may amount to a reasonable limit on that 
right if  taken in a different community. In short, the courts must accept, when applying the 
 The contextual nature of  the inquiry is evident, for instance, in the famous Quebec sign law case of  Ford v Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 153
SCR 712 at para 73, where the Court found that in light of  the special circumstances of  Quebec, “the aim of  the language policy underlying the 
Charter of  the French Language”, namely, “the defence and enhancement of  the status of  the French language in Quebec,” was “a serious and 
legitimate one.”
 Canadian Charter, supra note 11 at s 1 (“[t]he Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 154
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”).
 R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at para 69. 155
 Compare Wilkins, supra note 6, at 107: “[b]ecause the rights guaranteed in the Charter are not designed to make allowance for aboriginal 156
difference, it may well seem appropriate for courts to be more generous than usual when inherent-right communities are the ones engaged in 
the justification exercise.”  
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Oakes test, that the proper safeguarding of  Charter rights can occur in different ways in 
different cultural contexts.  
It is important to keep in mind, however, that if  our goal is to eventually achieve a 
full reconciliation of  Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state of  which they are part, we 
cannot simply regard any and all measures taken by inherent-right governments that aim to 
continue a community practice as thereby aiming at a pressing and substantial objective. The 
reason for this is that it is quite possible to imagine an established cultural practice within an 
Aboriginal community that is in irresolvable tension with certain rights guaranteed by the 
Charter. Further, just as ‘maintaining our traditions’ cannot be taken, per se, as a pressing and 
substantial objective for the purposes of  the Oakes test, neither can ‘exercising Aboriginal 
self-government.’ That is, while any measure implemented by an inherent-right government 
could sensibly be characterized as an exercise of  Aboriginal self-government, we must resist 
any temptation we might feel to regard all such measures as therefore necessarily animated 
by a ‘pressing and substantial’ objective. To do otherwise would not be in keeping with the 
goal of  reconciliation, nor would it be in keeping with decades of  established case law, which 
has consistently held that for the purposes of  the Oakes test the objective of  governmental 
action must be narrowly defined.   157
Ultimately, then, what this sort of  flexible s. 1 analysis is committed to is the view 
that, while there are some fundamental human rights that prevail across Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Canadian societies,  these rights may, again, legitimately find different 158
expression within different cultural contexts.  A culturally deferential s. 1 inquiry not only 159
treats this as a real possibility, it also aims to promote a form of  dialogue between Aboriginal 
governments and the non-Aboriginal dominated judiciary.  Specifically, it supports a 160
greater understanding of  Aboriginal cultural values by mainstream courts, since it 
encourages Aboriginal governments and other members of  the community to explain why, 
 R v KRJ, [2016] 1 SCR 906 at para 63; Sauvé v Canada (Chief  Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 SCR 519 at para 22; see also Tetreault-Gadoury v 157
Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission, [1991] 2 SCR 22.
 To be clear, for the conclusion that the entirety of  the Charter ought to apply to self-governing inherent right Aboriginal governments to be 158
sound, it is not required that the rights enshrined in the Charter reflect only interests that are universally held by all human beings. (My own 
view is that the vast majority, at least, of  the Charter’s protections do reflect universal basic interests.) We can confine the inquiry, instead, to 
whether the Charter’s rights are in any event compatible with the interests of  Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. And even if  we take the specific 
Charter right that is most arguably incompatible with the cultural values of  some of  Canada’s Indigenous peoples—s. 11(d)’s guarantee of  the 
“right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal”—we 
still find, I believe, that the underlying interest that this right serves to protect is indeed shared by Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians 
alike (and, I would argue, by all peoples everywhere). Specifically, given s. 11(d)’s evident purpose of  ensuring a fair hearing, courts should not 
regard its use of  the word ‘independent’ as categorically forbidding anyone who is well acquainted with an accused from determining what 
dispute resolution steps ought to be taken in their case. We can and should, instead, regard an ‘independent’ tribunal for the purposes of  s. 
11(d) as one that is not beholden to, or subject to the control or undue influence of, a party to the dispute. Once we have settled on this 
interpretation, two facts become clearer to us: firstly, that s. 11(d) ultimately reflects a universal human interest; and, secondly, that the right 
enshrined in s. 11(d) may legitimately find different expression in different cultural contexts. For instance, in the non-Aboriginal context—
which, let us assume, lacks the traditions of  harmony-restoring dispute resolution procedures partaken of  by individuals generally well-
acquainted with one another, such as are alive and well in many Aboriginal communities in Canada—ensuring that there is not even an 
appearance of  favouritism or undue influence may well require the sort of  independence prized by the non-Aboriginal Canadian legal system
—i.e., dispassionate unfamiliarity. But mandating that tribunals be independent according to this latter conception of  independence may well 
not be necessary to support—and could conceivably even undermine—the objective of  securing fairness in dispute resolution settings within 
a given Aboriginal community.
 As legal scholar Jeremy Webber puts it with respect to rights more generally, “the same abstract right may legitimately, when instantiated 159
within different legal traditions, take different forms, just as, for example, substantially the same commitment to private property is, in the 
common- and civil-law traditions, translated into quite different legal concepts” (Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Culture, 
Community, and the Canadian Constitution (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994) at 249).
 It is possible, although I think ultimately incorrect, to read s. 25 as mandating a culturally deferential interpretation of  the Charter’s 160
provisions wherever these regulate Aboriginal government action. See Royal Commission: Restructuring the Relationship, supra note 6 
(“[u]nder section 25, the Charter must be interpreted flexibly to account for the distinctive philosophies, traditions and cultural practices of  
Aboriginal peoples” at 160); See also Hogg and Turpel, supra note 7 (“[s]ection 25 allows an Aboriginal government to design programs and 
laws which are different, for legitimate cultural reasons, and have these reasons considered as relevant should such differences invite judicial 
review under the Charter” at 215).
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in light of  the particular cultural circumstances of  the group, certain Charter rights ought to 
be realized in a manner that differs from the way in which these rights are realized in the 
wider community.  
Importantly, this culturally-sensitive Oakes test does not embrace moral relativism. It 
does not suggest that the individual rights that should be observed by Aboriginal 
governments are whatever rights their members wish to see observed, for instance. Rather, 
the question of  whether a right-impairing policy amounts to a reasonable limit on that right 
depends in part on the importance of  the objective it seeks to advance. Since the importance 
of  a collective goal is at least partly a function of  the values and traditions of  the relevant 
collectivity, the same right-limiting policy might amount to a reasonable limit in one political 
community and an unreasonable limit in another. Thus, in affirming that some legal rights—
such as, perhaps, the right that one’s case be heard by a stranger (or near stranger)—are only 
essential to protect individual freedom in certain settings, we opt for a morally objectivist 
position. Indeed, to assume that anything labelled a ‘right’ is necessarily of  great value in all 
times and all places, without looking carefully at whether that right is itself  merely the 
product of  one time and place, is to take the path of  moral absolutism.  
Conclusion 
The question of  whether the Charter should apply to constrain the actions of  
inherent-right Aboriginal governments is a difficult one. For reasons of  space, we have 
largely had to put aside arguments to the effect that specific provisions of  the Charter (such 
as s. 11(d) in particular) make demands that are simply inappropriate in the context of  many 
Aboriginal communities. We have likewise been unable to take up the claim that the nature 
of  Aboriginal customs means that they will inevitably confound the Charter’s section 1 
analysis.  Even if  we assume, as I believe, that these objections are superable, to claim that 161
the Charter ought to restrain Aboriginal governments exercising the inherent right of  self-
government exposes one to the accusation that one has failed to adequately respect that 
collective right, and has thereby not properly reckoned with the reality of  Aboriginal 
sovereignty. Moreover, the rejoinder that the collective right of  self-government is not 
absolute and must be exercised in accordance with the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
Charter is likely to elicit, from those opposed to the Charter’s automatic application  to these 162
governments, the charge that one is countenancing a kind of  cultural imperialism, in which 
the collectivist and harmony-seeking traditions of  Aboriginal groups can find legitimate 
governmental expression only insofar as they are cognizable within, and acceptable to, a legal 
system steeped in the hostile individual rights paradigm of  liberalism. 
Fortunately, as Patrick Macklem has observed, the Charter “presents numerous 
interpretive opportunities to minimize the potentially corrosive effects that litigation might 
have on Aboriginal forms of  social organization, and to maximize the protection it affords 
 The concern here being that it is unfairly onerous to require an Aboriginal community to identify the objective animating a potentially 161
ancient custom, and then prove that it is “pressing and substantial” by the lights of  21st Century Canadian courts. (See e.g. Wilkins, supra note 
6, at 104.)
 To be clear, while I think the Charter should apply automatically to Aboriginal governments—i.e., even in the absence of  a self-government 162
agreement under which the parties agree on the Charter’s application to the relevant Aboriginal government—nothing said above is meant to 
suggest that there is no value in having the Charter’s application to the Aboriginal government agreed upon by all parties. Quite the contrary. I 
think it is clear that formal agreements on this issue are all to the good. See also Hogg, supra note 8 (“[T]he details of  the extent of  a First 
Nation’s powers of  self-government, and the paramountcy rules that would govern the application of  federal or provincial (or territorial) law 
to aboriginal lands and people, are of  course much better embodied in self-government agreements (with the status of  treaties) between 
aboriginal nations and governments. These agreements can deal comprehensively with all the issues of  governance, and supply enough clarity 
to keep the issues out of  the courts” at §28-27).
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to less powerful members of  Aboriginal societies.”  Taking advantage of  such 163
opportunities offers the promise of  protecting the basic human rights of  individual 
Aboriginal Canadians, while showing due respect for indigenous difference and the inherent 
right of  Aboriginal self-government. Further, the Charter’s application to inherent-right 
governments would help to advance the objective of  reconciliation that animates the 
Constitution’s recognition of  Aboriginal rights in s. 35. 
To be clear, and to reiterate what has been said above, applying the Charter to 
inherent-right governments would constitute a limitation on Aboriginal sovereignty and on 
the inherent right of  self-government contemplated by s. 35. There is, therefore, a real sense 
in which we have a clash of  rights whenever the exercise of  the inherent right of  self-
government unreasonably limits a Charter right. The correct response is, firstly, to 
acknowledge that we face a dilemma. We should be committed to the view that limitations 
on Charter rights stand in need of  justification, and at the same time should also insist that 
limitations on Aboriginal rights likewise demand justification. Thus where we find, even after 
employing a culturally sensitive s. 1 analysis, that some particular exercise of  the inherent 
right of  Aboriginal self-government gives rise to an unreasonable limit on a Charter right, we 
will have to determine whether it should nevertheless be permitted as the exercise of  an 
Aboriginal right, or forbidden as a violation of  the relevant Charter right. In doing so, it is 
appropriate that we have regard to the objectives of  the relevant Aboriginal right  and the 164
relevant Charter right.  The Supreme Court of  Canada has told us that the overarching 165
objective of  s. 35’s recognition of  Aboriginal rights is reconciliation, and we have found that 
the sort of  reconciliation s. 35 should be understood as aspiring to is reconciliation as 
relationship—namely, a relationship in which Canada’s Aboriginal peoples are reconciled 
with the Canadian state of  which they form an integral part. Requiring the right of  
Aboriginal self-government to be exercised in accordance with the Canadian Constitution 
would further that goal; allowing the right to be exercised irrespective of  the requirements 
of  the Charter would frustrate it. It is therefore right and proper that the Charter apply to 
inherent-right governments. 
This is emphatically not to say, of  course, that the Charter’s application is a sufficient 
condition of  the kind of  reconciliation s. 35 seeks. It seems clear, in fact, that it is much 
more crucial to pursue reconciliation via other, broadly political means, such as negotiating 
self-government agreements, reforming (or perhaps even repealing) the Indian Act, fully 
adopting and implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous 
Peoples,  and generally improving the social conditions in which Aboriginal Canadians live 166
on- and off-reserve.  Furthermore, if  we take a long-term view, the Charter’s application to 167
inherent-right governments is probably not even a necessary condition of  reconciliation. For 
instance, it may well be desirable, from the point of  view of  reconciling Aboriginal peoples 
and the Canadian state of  which they are part, for Canada to one day move to a regime in 
 Macklem, supra note 8 at 195.163
 See Sparrow, supra note 17 (“[t]he nature of  s. 35(1) itself  suggests that it be construed in a purposive way” at para 56). 164
 See Hunter v Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145 on the need for the Charter to be given a broad, purposive interpretation.165
 This is item 43 of  the Truth and Reconciliation Committee of  Canada’s Calls to Action (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  Canada: 166
Calls to Action (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of  Canada, 2015)). It is worth noting that the text of  UNDRIP, in laying out 
the right of  indigenous peoples, by no means precludes subjecting Aboriginal self-government to Charter review. On the contrary, it shows a 
clear appreciation for the way in which indigenous rights might be exercised in ways that are in tension with other rights, and countenances 
limitations on those indigenous rights in such circumstances. Article 46(2), for example, states that: “In the exercise of  the rights enunciated in 
the present Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms of  all shall be respected. The exercise of  the rights set forth in this 
Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations. 
Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of  others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of  a democratic society.”
 See Royal Commission: Restructuring the Relationship, supra note 6 at 950.167
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which, rather than the Canadian Charter, a Charter (or Charters) of  rights drafted by 
Aboriginal communities themselves—and possibly interpreted and applied by special courts 
comprising judges largely or exclusively of  Aboriginal descent—constrain the actions of  
inherent-right governments. At the present time, however, taking Canada, its legal and 
constitutional order, and its Aboriginal peoples as we actually find them, applying the Charter 
of  Rights and Freedoms to such governments would advance rather than impede the 
reconciliation that s. 35 compels us to seek. 
